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ABSTRACT 
The paper reports on an experimental investigation of four 
methods of allocating public goods. The two basic processes studied 
are direct contribution and a public goods auction process. Both of 
these processes are studied with and without an additional unanimity 
feature. The results suggest that the auction process outperforms 
direct contribution. The effect of unanimity is to decrease the 
efficiency of both processes. Much of the paper is focused on an 
analysis of these results. 
AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF 
PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION MECHANISMS WITH AND WITHOUT UNANIMITY• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Jeffrey S. Banks, Charles R. Plott 
California Institute of Technology 
David P. Porter 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
The experiments reported below are one small part of a much 
larger and more complex research effort. A detailed explanation of 
the context would be completely out of place, but a brief description 
will help the reader understand the design and our priorities in 
reporting results. 
The United States National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration ( NASA) has prepared to launch a manned space station, 
which is to become operational by 1994. Because the station will have 
low gravitational fields and an absence of atmosphere� the facility 
can be used for a variety of purposes ranging from basic research to 
manufacturing. The experiments reported below are part of a task that 
involves designing a method for the government to choose among all of 
the competing uses. Much sentiment exists within the government 
( NASA) to rely as heavily as is possible upon market processes. The 
task that motivates the research is to determine what form such 
reliance might take. 
The observation that sets the stage for our narrow research 
questions is that the space station will have many features 
characteristic of public utilities. Ideas and suggestions about 
alternatives to public utility pricing lead naturally to questions 
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about decentralized methods of covering common coats and to subsequent 
questions about decentralized methods for solving the public goods 
provision problem. 
Several theoretical solutions to the public goods problem 
exist in the literature . (See Groves and Ledyard, 1985, for a 
review.) Our operating assumption has been that a mechanism that 
reliably solves public goods problems can be adapted to solve common 
cost problems. Unfortunately, very little is known about the 
behavioral properties of such mechanisms. Most of them have been 
subjected to no experimentation at all. The most promising mechanism ,  
based on the existing experimental evidence, is a mechanism designed 
by Vernon Smith ( 1979a,b; 1980). Even though the theoretical aspects 
of the Smith process are not fully understood, the previous 
experimental evidence is that the mechanism can be used to solve 
public goods problems with a high degree of reliability and 
efficiency. If the Smith process or some variation of it is indeed a 
reliable method of solving the public goods problem, then it or a 
suitable modification of it might serve as a foundation for solving 
common cost aspects of space station pricing problems. Theory 
suggests this possibility and Smith's previous experiments are 
corroborative. 
The research strategy reported in this paper was to 
investigate the .reliability of the Smith process under the most 
difficult parametric conditions (economic environment) that have been 
reported in the literature, 
For some unknown reason certain public goods environments are 
"easy" in the sense that several processes manage to generate near 
optimal amounts of the public good while other environments are 
difficult in the sense that tested processes generate near zero 
levels. Our strategy was to first test the proposed processes within 
a difficult environment. If the performance was satisfactory, the 
research strategy was to then perform additional experiments in other 
enviroilments thought to be similarly difficult and/or related to 
environments that might actually exist for space stations. Naturally 
data and theories that might lead to improved processes would be 
analyzed along the way. The overall task envisages many different 
types of experiments and simulations and not just one. This paper 
reports on the first step. 
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The most difficult environment explored to date was developed 
by Isaac, McCue, and Plott ( 1985), A direct contribution process that 
has worked reasonably well in other environments, (Smith 1979b), was 
shown to lead to near zero levels of public good provision. If the 
Smith process or some slight variation performed well in this 
environment, the stage would be set for further development and 
experiments with the Smith prooess. 
As will be outlined below, two variations of the Smith process 
were studied: one with a unanimity provision and one without the 
unanimity provision. As a control a direct contribution mechanism 
with unanimity and without unanimity was also studied. The economic 
environment was the one developed by Isaac, McCue, and Plott. 
Initial expectations based on previous experiments were that 
the Smith process with unanimity would produce decisions near 100 
percent levels of efficiency. It was further suspected that removal 
of the unanimity provision would cause substantial reductions in 
efficiency. Both expectations were proven incorrect. After 
presenting those central results that were relevant to the initial 
purposes of the experiment, section V continues by presenting ex post 
analysis of the reasons for the unexpected results. The section 
concludes with some analysis of choices and strategies at the 
individual level of analysis. 
II, THE DECISION MECHANISMS AND PARAMETERS 
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The experimental task presented the subject was to 
collectively provide a public good using one of the four mechanisms to 
be described below. Each subject was given a payoff function 
expressing personal reward from various levels of the public good, q, 
before any payments for the provif'.ions of the good. Two functional 
forms were used. 
U�(q) 44 - 1.lq ( in cents) ( high payoff) 
or 
U�(q) 27. 6  - 0.8q ( in cents) ( low payoff) 
thereby.yielding two types of agents. Instead of the actual 
functional form. the subjects were given the discrete approximations
given in Figures 1 and 2. There were five agents of each type. In 
all the Smith process experiments the experimental medium was francs 
in that all bids were in francs while all but one of the direct 
contribution experiments used cents. Each individual was privately 
given a personal dollar/franc conversion rate. 
Since the variable q is common to all payoffs, it is a public 
good. Subjects were told that the good would be provided at a 
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constant marginal cost of 130 cents per unit. The task was to use the 
decision mechanisms to choose both a quantity and an allocation of the 
common· cost among themselves. As shown on Figure 2 the optimal 
quantity is any amount in the interval (23,24). 
The decision was not made only once. The process of deciding, 
paying, and being paid was called a period. Each experiment consisted 
of several periods. Thus , decisions were replicated several times by 
each group so that the effects of replication and/or experience could 
be assessed. 
Four different mechanisms were used. The basic mechanisms 
were either direct contribution or the Smith process. Each was 
studied with and without a unanimity feature. 
Direct Contribution without Unanimity (DC). At the beginning of a 
period each agent being fully aware of his/her private payoff 
function, chose a level of personal contribution bi' These decisions
were privately transmitted (slips of paper) to the experimenter who 
10 
computed [ bi.i=l 
10 " 
The quantity, �
1
bi/130¢ = q, was then calculated and 
announced. Each individual then calculated u1(q) - bi = ni' where
ui(q) is the payoff function for i and bi is the contribution of i.
The amount, ni, was the profit for individual i during that period
which was his/hers to keep . In brief, the individual's contributions 
are collected and were all used to purchase units of the public good. 
The return to the individual for that period was the value of the 
public good provided minus the contribution. 
Direct Contribution with Unanimity (DCU). Each period of the process 
consisted of a series of up to five trials (the first period had ten 
trials). The direct contribution process was used as described above 
up to the calculation of ni. After calculating ni a vote was taken.
If it was unanimously affirmative, each agent was paid ni and the
mechanism proceeded to the next period. If one or more no votes were 
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registered, then no payments were made and a new "trial" was initiated 
in which agents could tender new bids. If no unanimous agreement was 
attained after five trials, no payment was made for that period and 
the next period was started. 
Smith Process without Unanimity (SP), Each period consisted of a 
series of trials. At the beginning of a trial each agent chose a 
2-tuple (bi,qi), which was privately transmitted to the experimenter.
10 10 
The quantities, �
1
bi and 1/10 �1qi = q were computed. If
10 J:
1
bi 2 130¢, then the profit for each agent, i, was ni = U
i(q) - biq'
i If [ bi > 130¢, each agent received a rebate of the
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excess.1 With q decided and each person paid, the period was ended,
and the experiment moved to the first trial of the next period. If 
[ bi < 130¢, then the provision level was 0 on that trial. The
mechanism then moved to the next trial in which new choices could be 
made, If no trial of the five permissible resulted in [ bi 2 130¢,
the period ended with zero payment to all and a new period was 
initiated. 
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Smith Process with Unanimity ( SPU) . The process was identical to SP 
except that a vote was taken if � bi 1 130¢. That is, if � bi 1 cost,
then q was announced so individual profits could be calculated and 
then a vote was taken. If the decision was unanimously accepted, then 
each agent received the profit (positive or negative). If the vote 
was not unanimous, then the provision level was zero, no payments were 
made , and the next trial began. Except for the first period all 
periods had a maximum of five trials. 
Two features of the procedures/process are worthy of special 
note. First, in SP and in DC where real possibilities of losses 
existed, subjects were given five dollars working capital at the 
beginning of the experiment. The failure to provide this working 
capital in the two cases where unanimity operated was a design error 
that forces us to include the capital payment along with unanimity 
itself as a treatment variable. Of course theoretically the capital 
payment should make no difference since it was a lump sum grant at the 
beginning of the experiment and subjects were never in a situation in 
which they needed to speculate on whether or not the experimenter 
would (or could) take money from them. 
A second feature involves a restricted message space . Bids 
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could never be negative , i. e., bi e [O , �) .  This feature differs from
Smith ( 1979a) but not Smith ( 1979b, 1980). In the Smith processes the 
messages about quantities were restricted to tenths and qi e [0 , qi]
where2
_ {40 if i is in high group 
qi = 34 if i is in low group
Smith 's research (1979a,b 1980) led to broad conclusions 
relevant to the research reported here. 
( 1) In periods in which an agreement was obtained, the Smith process 
( SPU) results in quantity levels of the public good that do not 
differ significantly from the theoretical Lindahl optimum. 
( 2) Final bids submitted by participants were not demand revealing 
( Smith 1979b, 1980). However, Smith (1979a) found support for 
demand-revealing ( Lindahl bids) behavior. 
( 3) The direct contribution process with unanimity generated levels 
of public good choices that were not significantly different from 
those generated by SPU. 
The situation studied here differs from that studied by Smith 
in several potentially important ways. Any of these could account for 
the differences with Smith that we report. 
(1) Smith used different payoff parameters, His utility functions 
permitted income effects while ours are additive. 
(2 )  The difference between the free-rider and Lindahl quantities was 
less in in Smith . His free-rider quantity was three units and 
the Lindahl quantity was nine. Ours were zero and twenty-three 
respectively. 
( 3) Smith ' s  experiments primarily involved only one choice for which 
the groups were paid but some of his groups were asked to 
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participate in a second period. Our experiments involved several 
repetitions of three to nine periods. 
( 4) The Smith ( 1979a ) method of putting the unanimity process into 
operation was different from ours. For the Smith process the 
Smith experiments had all subjects report the same level of the 
public good twice and the same (cost covering) bid twice. In ours 
a vote was taken whenever cost was covered. Our method of 
implementing unanimity is the same as in Smith (1979b, 1980 ) .  
I II. MODELS 
The primary research questions focus upon the reliability of 
the Smith process to produce efficient choices and the influences of 
unanimity. These questions are not motivated by theory so much as by 
experiences with the operation of the mechanism and by the overriding 
problem of finding a mechanism that "works reliably," Theory and 
models do have a role in providing an understanding of why the 
mechanisms perform as they do and in suggesting modifications . In 
this section some of the relevant models are outlined. 
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The Lindahl optimum or Lindahl equilibrium concept has played 
a special role in the public goods literature so it is a natural 
concept to explore. Briefly, a Lindahl equilibrium in a public goods 
environment is a quantity q• of the public good and a vector of prices 
(p1,, • •  , pn ) such that the marginal benefit to each individual of q• is
equal to his price. Given the specific parameter values above, the 
Lindahl equilibrium quantity in the experiments is in the interval 
( 23,24] , with prices 
{ 17 . 61 
p -i 8.4¢ 
if i e high demand group 
if i e low demand group. 
The Lindahl equilibrium concept is sometimes thought to be a normative 
criterion. Game-theoretic equilibrium analysis generates predictions 
on what might happen given the strategic possibilities of the 
individuals, where an (arguably ) appropriate model is that of Nash 
equilibrium or any of its possible refinements. One question we can 
then ask is whether any of the mechanisms discussed above implement 
the Lindahl equilibrium via Nash equilibrium behavior; that is, does 
there exist a Hash equilibrium to the game generated from the 
mechanism which supports the Lindahl equilibrium as a solution? 
In what follows we characterize only the equilibria in the 
static, "one-shot" games, leaving aside the equilibria of the 
supergames derived from the use of repeated trials in the 
determination of outcomes. Furthermore, we will look at only the 
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perfect Nash equilibria (Selten 1975) . 
Let mi be the message individual i sends, where mi consists of
a bid (bi) and quantity (qi) for SP and SPU, and simply a bid for DC
and DCU, and let m = (m1, ••• ,mn) .  Each vector m implies a vector of
profits n(m) = (n1(m), ••• ,nn(m) ) for the individuals determined by the
mechanism in use. For SPU and DCU we will denote these as interim 
profits. Given the sequential nature of decision-making in SPU and 
DCU (i.e., sending messages, receiving data, and then proceeding to 
vote), a strategy for individual i will consist of a message mi and a
vote function vi(
•) where without loss of generality we can let vi(
•)
be a function of i's interim profits. 
The elimination of weakly dominated strategies inherent in the 
perfectness criterion implies that, in a perfect Nash equilibrium of 
• • SPU or DCU v (·) = (v1(
•),  ••• ,vn(·) ) must satisfy, for all i,
• vi (
.) =
{vote yes 
vote no 
if ni(m) 2. 0
if ni(m) � O. 
(If ni(m) = 0, i is indifferent between voting yes and no.) Thus, in a
perfect Nash equilibrium, individual i cannot threaten to vote no if 
his interim profits are positive; this threat, which is allowable 
under the Nash equilibrium concept, is a consequence of voting 
strategies such as {vote yes 
vi(-) = 
vote no 
if ni(m) 2. ni
if ni(m) i ni,
where ni > O is the equilibrium interim profit of i, Thus, any
quantity level q can be supported by Nash equilibrium behavior if 
there exists a vector of bids b = (b1, ••• ,bn) such that all
individuals earn non-negative profits. 
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Define b_i = (b1, ••• ,bi-l'bi+l'''''bn),  and similarly for q_i.
The (pure strategy) perfect Nash equilibrium predictions for the 
mechanisms are as follows: 
SP: (b•,q•) is a perfect Nash equilibrium if3
i) � b� = 130¢, 1/n � q� s [23,24), and 
b. i 
17.6¢ if i e high demand group
8.4¢ if i e low demand group 
ii) � b� < 130¢, and Vi, 
max ni(b_i,130¢ - bj,q-i,qi) < O. 
. � .. 
qi i 
Thus, if the mechanism is SP and if costs are covered, then the 
(interior) perfect Nash equilibria support the Lindahl optimal outcome 
as an equilibrium. 
SPU: (b•,q•,v•(·) ) is a perfect Nash equilibrium if i) or ii) holds,
and 
{ vote yes if ni(b,q) 2. O 
iii) Vi, V�( •) = 
vote no if ni(b,q) � o. 
Since, at the Lindahl optimum all individuals earn positive profits, 
both SP and SPU implement the Lindahl optimum as perfect Nash 
equilibrium behavior. 
DC : (b
•
) is a perfect Nash equilibrium if 
iv) 0 ,  Vi.
Thus, the only perfect Nash equilibrium in DC is the "free-riding" 
equilibrium. 
DCU : (b*, v*<·)) is a perfect Nash equilibrium if iii) holds 
(replacing m = (b, q) with m (b)) and 
or 
v) ICi e I :  ni(b
•
) = OJI i. 2, and 
• • vi (b ) =yes, \Ii; 
vi) 3 j s. t.  
Vi, \lb� 
• • 
vj(b ) = no, and 
• • I s . t. [vk(b_i, bi) =yes, \lk f iJ. 
Thus, for DCU there exist perfect Nash equilibrium outcomes with 
positive q uantities of the public good . However, in these equilibria 
at least two individuals must be making zero profits because if only 
o ne person is making zero profits that person should lower the bid. 
If there is no allocation then it must be the case that no individual 
can (profitably) change his/her bid and induce others to bid yes . 
Hence, neither DC nor DCU implements the Lindahl optimum via perfect 
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Nash equilibrium behavior. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Subjects were recruited from Pasadena City College (PCC) and 
California Institute of Technology (CIT). They were asked to 
participate in an economics experiment for which they would be paid. 
Each experiment consisted of ten subjects and lasted for about two 
hours. The exact instructions read to the subjects are included as 
Appendix A. 
A total of twenty-four experiments were conducted. Six 
experiments were conducted under each of three treatment variables 
(DCU, SP, SPU) . The six experiments with DC are those that were 
reported in Isaac, Mccue, and Plott ( 1985 ) .4 The experiments with 
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relevant parameters are in Table 1 .  
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The time series from all trials of all experiments are in 
Figures 3, 4, 5, 6. The results relative to the questions that
motivated the experiments are reviewed in the first subsection. The 
subsections following the first deal substantially with questions that 
arose after the experiments were conducted and the data analysis had 
been initiated. The second subsection involves inquiries about the 
accuracy of models of the processes. The third subsection elaborates 
an observation that the tradeoff exists among performance variables of 
primary interest. The overall performance of the process is analyzed 
in terms of success and failure . The final section is devoted to 
TABLE 1 
EXPERIMENTAL PARAMETERS 
Number of Subjects 
per Payoff Group Lindahl Contribution 
Experiment Subject Pool High Low Optimal Quantity High(t'l) Low(¢;) 
Direct Contribgtion
with Unanimity 
1 PCC 5 5 (23 ,24] 17 . 6  8.4 
2 PCC 5 5 (23,24] 17.6 B.4 
3 PCC 5 5 ( 23. 24] 17.6 8 .4 
4 CIT 5 5 (23 ,24] 17 . 6  8 .4 
5 PCC s 5 (23,24] 17 . 6  8 .4 
6 CIT s s ( 23 ,24] 17. 6 8.4 
Direct Contribution
without Unanimitya 
1 CIT s s (23 ,24] 17. 6 8 .4 
2 CIT 5 5 (23 ,24] 17. 6 8.4 
3 PCC s 5 (23 ,24] 17 . 6  8 .4 
4 CIT 5 5 ( 23 ,24] 17 . 6  8.4 
s PCC 5 5 (23,24] 17 . 6  8.4 
6 CIT 5 s ( 23 ,24] 17 . 6  8 .4 
Smith Process 
with Unanimity 
1 CIT s s (23,24] 17 . 6  8.4 
2 CIT 5 s (23 ,24] 17. 6 8 . 4  
3 CIT s s ( 23 ,24] 17 . 6  8.4 
4 PCC s s ( 23 ,24] 17. 6 8 . 4  
s PCC s s ( 23. 24] 17 . 6  8.4 
6 CIT s s (23 ,24] 17. 6 8.4 
Smith Process 
without Unanimity 
1 CIT s s (23 ,24] 17. 6 8 . 4  
2 CIT s s (23 ,24] 17 . 6  8.4 
3 PCC 5 s (23,24] 17 . 6  8.4 
4 PCC s s (23 ,24] 17. 6 8 .4 
s PCC s s (23,24] 17 . 6  8.4 
6 CIT s s (23 ,24] 17.6 8 . 4  
a. The information in this table is taken from Isaac, Mccue, and Plott (1985) .
b. Values were represented in francs in experiment 1 and in cents in experiments 2-5 .
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isolating manifestations of strategic uses of unanimity. 
The main results from the experiments can be categorized in 
the box in Table 2 that shows the overall provision levels. The 
statistical analysis of the elements of Table 2 will be based 
primarily on distribution-free statistics. Specifically, we will 
employ the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test (see Lehmann, 1975) unless otherwise 
stated. We use this nonparametric test since : 
(a) most of the distributions tend to be multimodal and skewed; 
(b) we have no reason to suspect normality of the underlying 
distributions; 
(c) most of our tests are two sample problems in which equality of 
the two distributions are tested. 
Before we present our conclusions we point out that the data used in 
the statistical analysis are at times pooled over trials or periods of 
the experiments .  Since the data in any one experiment are sequential, 
the assumption of independence in these cases does not likely hold. 
Thus. while the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test is in general robust it does 
require independence . 
To read Table 3 the mechanisms listed in the table column are 
assumed to generate samples with a cumulative distribution F(z), and 
the mechanisms listed in the table row are assumed to generate samples 
with a cumulative distribution G(z). The z-scores listed in the table 
are derived from testing the hypothesis 
F(z) G(z) Vz 
against 
Ha F(z) > G(z) Vz 
1 ,  Overall Performance of Mechanisms 
Conclusion 1. The Smith process generates project levels that are
more efficient than the direct contribution mechanisms. 
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Supoort. Notice first in Table 2 that with or without unanimity the 
Smith process has higher levels of provision and higher efficiency 
levels than does the DC or DCU processes. If all periods are 
considered, then from Table 3 we find that the SP levels are 
significantly higher than DC or DCU . The lowest z scor e is 2.71 for 
which a = .003, when SP is compared to DC. For SPU evaluated in Table 
3, the equality of the distributions cannot be rejected only when it 
is compared to DC. 
Conclusion 2. The inclusion of unanimity reduces the overall 
efficiency of the process. 
Support .  From Table 2 the addition o f  unanimity i s  associated with a 
fall in the overall provision level in both SP (provisio n goes from 
13.7 to 10.6) and DC (provision goes from 4.7 to 1.2) . These
reductions are significant when comparing DC to DCU (z 5.18) but the
differences have very low significance (z = .80,a = .21) when 
comparing SP to SPU. 
With 
Unanimity 
Without 
Unanimity 
TABLE 2 
AVERAGE PROVISION LEVELS AND EFFICIENCIES 
Smith Process 
x y z 
Direct Contr i bution 
x y z 
10.6 12.3 9.4 I 1.2 1.1 1.2 • (48.7) (57) (44) (8.0) (7.0) (8.0) 
13.7 17.3 11.4 I 4.7 8.0 3.3 (66.5) (86) (51) (32.0) (53) (21) 
x = mean level of provision for all periods. 
y = mean level of provision for "early" periods 1 and 2. 
z = mean level of provision for "later" periods 3 and greater.
The numbers in parentheses are the associated mean efficiency 
(%)level s .  
TABLE 3 
WILCOXON RANK SUM TEST OF PROVISION LEVELS OF ALL PERIODS• 
G 
F SPU DC DCU 
SP z = 0.80 z = 2.71 z = 4.06 
a = 0.21 a = 0.003 a "'0.00 
SPU z = 0.07 z = 2. 65 
a = 0.47 a = 0.004 
DC z = 5 .20 
a "'0.00 
•Ranks do not change if efficiency levels are used instead of
provision levels since efficiencies increase as provisions increase 
to x = 24 units and in the cases where x > 24 units, the efficiencies
still dominate . 
Conclusion 3. In terms of overall provision levels (efficiency) the 
mechanisms can be ranked as follows: 
SP L SPU L DC > DCU and SP > DC. 
Support. Combine the results of conclusions 1 and 2. 
Conclusion 4. The overall provision level ( efficiency) in SP and DC
falls with replication of periods . 
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Support . Table 2 shows the pooled data from the early periods (1 and 
2) with the later periods (3 and greater ) .  The provision in the early 
periods of SP is 17.3 and it is 11.4 for the later periods . For DC 
the levels are 8.0 and 3.3 respectively. From Table 4 these z-scores 
are seen to be 1.29 (a = .10) and 3.61 (a = .00) respectively.
However, the SP results are sensitive to the zero allocations. 
Conclusion 5. The overall provision level ( ef ficiency ) of DCU 
increases with replica tion of periods , and it falls in SPU , but not 
significantly. 
Support. Table 2 shows the pooled data from the early periods (1 and 
2) with the later periods (3 and greater) . The provision in the early 
periods of SPU is 12.3 and it is 9.4 for the later periods. For DCU 
the levels are 1.1 and 1.2 respect! vely . From Table 4 these z-scores 
are seen to be .51 (a = .30) and . 34 (a = .37) respect! vely . However ,  
the results are sensitive t o  the zero alloca tions in either case . 
TABLE 4 
WILCOXON RANK SUM TEST 
OF EARLY VS. LATER PROVISION LEVELS• 
SPU z = 0.51 a = 0.30 
SP z 
= 1.29 
a = 0.10 
DCU z = 0 .34 a = 0.37 
DC z = 3.61 a "' 0.00 
•The hypothesis to be considered here is that there is no repetition
effect against the alternative that early provision levels dominate 
later provision levels. 
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Summarizing the results o f  this section, three major features 
of the data are apparent . First, the Smith process is more efficient 
than is direct contribution, Secondly, the addi tion of unanimity to a 
mechanism is not an overall hel p to the performance level as measured 
so far . Third, the operation of time and experience does not serve to 
improve matters . In some cases the problems get worse. The inclusion 
of unanimity, however, prevents a significant decay in performance 
that occurs in its absence across the mechani sms . 
2 .  Models of Individual Behavior 
The next two conclusions provide useful background for 
considering models of individual behavior . Both conclusions identify 
aggregate behavior that hopefully is explicable in terms of models 
based on an individual level of analysi s .  We wil l then proceed to 
explore the available models as well as an ad hoc model in hope of 
finding an adequate explanation of these phenomena . 
Conclusion 6 .  The sum of bids increases during a period o f  SP and SPU 
and decreases i n  DCU during a period (in DC there are no trial s ) . 
Support . From Table 5 we find that the mean bid in on the last trial 
is 1302 in SPU and 1206 in SP with standard deviations of 8 9 . 6  and 
129 . 8  respe ctively . While the overall mean of 1 272 for SPU and 1 1 1 5  
for SP with standard deviations o f  26 0 . 3  and 256 . 0  respectively .  
Using a sign test t o  test equal probability o f  movements we obtain a 
z-score of 4.93 for SPU and S . 41 for SP so that sum of bids is 
increasing . Furthermore, the z-score is -2 . 82 for DCU so that sum of 
bids is decreasing . 
Conclusion 7, Aggregate proposed quantities are near the Lindahl 
optimum for SPU and SP . 
Support . Table 5 shows that the mean project size for al l trials is 
2 2 . 1  i n,SPU and 19 . 8  for SP and that for the last trial mean project 
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sizes are 2 1 . 1  and 22 . 0  respectivel y .  The range o f  the project levels 
is 13 . 6  to 33 for SPU and 11 . 1  to 2 9 . 6  for SP . 
Given the dynamic structure of the experiments ( e . g . ,  a series of 
trials leading to a possible agreement ) ,  a Nash reaction model may 
provide an explanation for individual decision-making . Each 
individual adjusts bids and quantities to maximize utility given that 
the other participants leave their bids and quanti ties unchanged from 
the previous trial . Conceivably, some sor t of Nash reaction would 
induce a dynamic feature that keeps quantities and bids moving in the 
"right" direction. Since the Nash reaction i s  a point response which 
is not likely to be seen, two weaker model s are devel oped . These two 
additional models ask only if the variables are moving in the "right "  
direction. 
The structure of a Nash gradient reaction model wil l be 
developed for the Smith process as follows . The extension to the DC 
mechanism is trivial . Let b�:l = 1 3 0¢ - �ib� and x�:l denote Nash 
bid and project level reactions for individual i at time t .  Since we 
truncated the message spaces in our experiment, i . e . ,  b� 2 O and 
i .A A xt e [0,x], where x = 40 for the high value group and 3 4  for the low 
Process 
SPU - All Trials 
Last Trial of 
Trials Period 
SP - All Trials 
Last Trial of 
Trials Period 
DCU - All Trials 
End of Period 
Trials Period 
DC - All Periods 
Period 3+ 
TABLE 5 
MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF 
PERIOD-TRIAL BIDS AND PROJECT LEVELS• 
Sum of Bids 
Standard 
Mean Deviation Mean 
1272 260.3 22.1 
Period 1302 89.6 21.1 
3+ 1245 261.5 22.5 
1115 256.0 19. 8 
Period 1206 129.8 22.0 
3+ 1098 279.3 20.2 
7.6 
4.8 
3+ 6.7 3.17 
4.7 
3.3 
Project Level 
Standard 
Deviation 
3.98 
2.37 
4.21 
3.88 
1.80 
4.08 
6 .48 
2.16 
3 .91 
1.77 
•Sign test for the equal probability of movement on the sum of bids yields 
SPU 
z = 4.93 
a ct 0.00 
DCU 
z = -2,820 
a = 0.002 
SP 
z = 5 .41 
a t:: 0.00 
DC 
z = -2. 830 
a = 0.002 
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value group, we i• i• 
,.. i• must have bt+l LO and xt+l e [O,x]; thus if bt+l < 0
i• we set bt+l 0 
i• i• i• "' and if xt+l < O we set xt+l = 0 and for xt+l > x we
i• "' set xt+l = x. Finally, we note that if profits are negative for any 
feasible x�+l' given a price of 130¢ - ;ib�, then any reaction 
i• ,.. i• r j xt+l e [0,x] and 0 � bt+l < 130¢ - .ff:ibt would correspond to cost 
not
being covered and thus zero profits. Hence, we will ignore the cases 
of negative profits for any x�+l e [O,�] with a price of 130¢ - ;ib�. 
i •i i i i i• i Now, let Ax= (xt+l - xt)(xt+l - xt) if xt+l f xt+l and A
i = 1x 
i• i i i• i i i i• i if xt+l = xt+l' and Ab= (bt+l - bt)(bt+l - bt) if bt+l f bt+l and
A�= 1 if b�:l = b�+l' We say that individual i exhibits Nash 
gradient behavior if A! > O and A� > 0 and i exhibits weak Nash 
gradient behavior if A!, A� } o but A! f 0 or A� f 0, Notice that the 
act of voting is considered as neither a strategic nor an informative 
variable in the behavioral model. 
Conclusion 8, In both SPU and SP the overall response is consistent 
with weak Nash gradient reaction behavior. 
Support. Table 6A presents the aggregate Ax or Ab counts for both SPU
and SP. In every case, we can reject the hypothesis of equal 
probability of movement in project level and bids, in favor of 
movement in the Nash direction. We do note that there exists a 
substantial amount of cases of no changes in the bids and project 
level (see Table 6B), 
Conclusion 9. In both DCU and DC the overall response is consistent 
with Nash gradient reaction behavior. 
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Support. Table 6C shows the number of responses in each of the 
possible directions of movement. The z-score on the equal probability 
of move implies rejection in favor of movement in the Nash direction 
for DCU and DC. 
Turn now to a static model of individual behavior, namely the 
Lindahl equilibrium. The Smith experiments (1979b; 1980) suggest that 
one should check on the possibility of Lindahl behavior directly. 
Lindahl behavior might emerge even though an explanation in terms of 
strategic behavior is lacking. Of course in SP and SPU the Lindahl 
optimum is also a perfect Nash equilibrium. The following two 
conclusions demonstrate that the choices themselves are not Lindahl. 
Conclusion 10, High/low payoff group bids (after rebate) approximate 
equality, i.e., groups tend toward equal contribution when agreement 
occurs.5 
Support. Table 7 gives the mean bids and project levels for agreement 
periods by demand group, while Table 8 displays the test for.equal 
(130�) bids across groups. Testing the hypothesis that the bids from 
the high value and low value groups come from the same distribution 
upon agreement (nonzero provision successfully implemented) we obtain 
z-scores of z = 1.20 for SPU and z = 0.21 for SP via the Wilcoxon rank 
sum. Applying a parametric test of the equality of mean bids from 
Process 
SPU 
SP 
a. A ;;; (Ax.Ab) with 
A 0 <=> 
A � 0 <=> 
A 2. 0 <=> 
but 
TABLE 6A
NASH GRADIENT REACTIONa
(441/686) 64, 
z = 7.48 
a "' 0 . 00 
(233/361) 65'1& 
z = 5.53 
a "" 0 . 00 
the standard formulation that: 
Ax' Ab 0 
Ax' Ab � 0 
Ax' 
Ab � 0
A > O or Ab > 0 x 
(512/757) 68' 
z = 9.70 
a "' 0.00 
( 290/ 418) 59'. 
z = 7 .94 
a "'0.00 
b. The z-score is based on the test of the null hypothesis that,
given there was movement in at least one dimension, there is equal 
probability of positive-zero and negative (any direction) against the 
alternative of movement in positive-zero direction. If we consider 
A > 0 as the only positive movement, we obtain (197/686) for SPU and 
(116/361) for SP. 
c. The z-score is based on the null hypothesis of equal probability
of non-negative and negative (any direction) movement against the 
alternative of non-negative movement. 
TABLE 6B 
NASH GRADIENT REACTION PER MESSAGE DIMENSION• 
A x ) 0 Ax 2 o Ax < 0 Ab > 0 Ab 2 0 Ab < 0 
SPU 261 595 162 328 645 112 
z 4.82 z = 17.16 
a "' o . oo a "' o. oo 
SPU 155 321 97 215 314 104 
z = 3.65 z = 6.22 
a "'0.00 a "' o.oo 
• The z-scores are based on the test of null hypothesis that, given
there was movement in the stated direction, there is an equal 
probability of positive negative movement against the alternative of 
movement in the Nash direction. 
Process 
DCU 
DC 
TABLE 6C 
NASH GRADIENT REACTION• 
Ab > 0
609 
z = 10.87 
a "' 0.00 
1.84 
z = 7.62 
a "' 0.00 
Ab � 0 
1127 
276 
Ab < 0 
283 
64 
• The z-scores are based on the test of the null hypothesis that,
given there was movement in bids, there is an equal probability of 
positive-negative movement against the alternative of movement in the 
Nash directions. 
High Group 
Mean Bida
TABLE 7 
BID AND PROJECT LEVEL RESPONSE 
BY GROUP UPON "AGREEMENTS" 
SPU 
139.3 
SP DCU DC 
132.1 1425 7 81 
Standard Deviationbof Bid 66.3 89.1 830 1042 Mean Project Level 28.1 23.3 
Standard Deviation of Project Level 14.6 13.3 
!&.H Group 
Mean Bid 120.7 127 .9 906 
Standard Deviation of Bid 72.6 110.S 1001 
Mean Project Levelc 14.3 16.1 
Standard Deviation of Project Level 11.3 10.1 
a. All bids are expressed in francs (1000 francs = 1 U. S. dollar)
with rebate. 
417 
690 
b. The optimal project size for high group with median bid of 139.3
is 27 .4 and 132 .  1 is 28.0. 
c. The optimal project size for low group with median bid 120.7 is
18.9 and 127.9 is 18.S. 
Mechanism 
SPU 
SP 
TABLE 8 
HIGH/LOW GROUP BIDS• 
Rank Sum 
z = 1.20 
a = 0.22 
z = 0.21 
Q = 0.42 
t-test (equal means) 
t 0.95 (df = 138) 
a = 0.32 
t 0.32 (df 
a = 0.70 
208) 
• The 95% Confidence Intervals (francs) per payoff group and process
are: 
High 
Low 
(126.1 ! b ! 152.5) 
(106.0 � b � 135.4) 
(117.8 ! b ! 146.5) 
(111.1 � b � 144.7) 
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each group we obtain t ,95 (a .32) for SPU and t .32 (a .70) 
for SP. 
The results reported in conclusion 10 together with other 
aspects of the data set the stage for investigating an ad hoc model of 
individual choice behavior, Conclusion 10 suggests that a bargaining 
process among agents who are uninformed of the payoff of others is 
leading to an equal split similar to those observed by Roth (1983). 
Ten people splitting the 130¢ unit cost of the project results in a 
per person bid of 13¢ which approximately fits the facts. From the 
payoff charts one can determine that the optimum quantity for the high 
demand group facing such a price is 28 units and for the low demand 
group is 18 units. Suppose the five high demanders submitted quantity 
bids qi = 28 rather than the qi that would influence q in an optimum
manner. Suppose further, the low demanders followed a similar 
strategy and submitted qi = 18, The Smith process would produce the
"welfare maximizing" quantity of 23 units and thus operates at 100 
percent efficiency given that costs were actually covered, Table 7 
shows that, in SPU, the mean quantities are 28.1 and 14.3 units, 
giving a quantity of 21.2 units, The ad hoc model thus seeks to 
explain the high efficiency levels of the Smith process as resulting 
from (1) equality of bids, (2) truthful revelation of desired quantity 
given bids, and (3) parameter choices that lead (1) and (2) to 
generate optimal group choices of quantity. 
The next result tests the ad hoc model against an 
appropriately modified Nash reaction model. The question posed is 
whether the choices of qi' given the individual's bid, are closer to
the optimal Nash reaction or to demand revelation. 
Conclusion 1 1 .  The Nash reaction model is better (with marginal 
23 
significance) in SPU than the ad hoc model but in SP the ad hoc model 
is better. 
� .  For both models the distribution of errors was calculated. 
(error = quantity choice predicted by the model minus actual quantity 
chosen). The results are in Table 9 .  In SPU the average error 
(standard deviation) for the Nash reaction model and the ad hoc model 
were respectively 1.0 4  ( 17 . 6 )  and 1 . 7 8  ( 1 2 . 1 ) . The difference is 
significant at the . OS level of confidence. The error of the Nash 
model is on average smaller but the large variances suggest that the 
models are behaving badly. In SP the numbers for Nash and ad hoc are 
respectively 8 . 2  ( 16 . 4) and S . 9  ( 11 . S ) . In this case the errors of 
the ad hoc are on average smaller and the difference in averages is 
significant at . 0 1  level of confidence. However, the variances are 
again very large, suggesting that additional theory is required. 
3 .  Con1ectured Performance Tradeoffs 
Ex post data analysis suggests the existence of performance 
tradeoffs as one varies mechanisms. The first tradeoff is between the 
efficiency of the choice given the occurrence of a success (i.e. , a 
nonzero provision level was successfully implemented) and the rate of 
success. The second is a tradeoff between the success rate and the 
occurrence of bankruptcy (i.e. , a period in which an individual loses 
TABLE 9 
AVERAGE ERROR FROM PREDICTED MODEL 
(Standard Deviation) 
SPU 
Nash Reaction Model 1 . 0 4  
( 17 . 6 )  
Ad  Hoo Model 1 . 7 8  
( 12 . 1 )  
SP 
8 . 2  
( 16 . 4) 
S . 9 
( 1 1 . S )  
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money) . The following conclusions regarding the possible tradeoffs 
are tentative however; some of the observed differences in means are 
not significant. 
The first tradeoff can be seen in Table 10. Provision levels 
given a success go up with unanimity, while the success rate goes 
down. The lower success rate more than offsets the increase in 
provision levels given success, as can be inferred from conclusion 2 
above. A histogram is shown as Figure 7. 
Conclusion 12. Unanimity decreases the success rate of the mechanism. 
Support. From Table 10 we see that conditional on unanimity the 
success rate is lower; .so SPU vs • •  67 SP and . 13 DCU vs. 1.00 DC. 
Testing the equality of the proportion of failure per mechanism we 
find in Table 11 that z = 1.56 (a= .06) for SPU and SP; z = 1.2s 
(a � ,00) for DCU and DC . 
Conclusion 13. Unanimity increases the efficiency of the mechanisms 
given a success (nonzero provision) but not significantly. 
Support. The mean values are in Table 10. Table 12 provides the rank 
sum test statistics for the nonzero provision periods. While the mean 
provision is higher for SPU (21.3) than SP (19.7) the z-score is 1.11 
(a = .13) and t = 1.30 (a = .20) for equality. It is clear that the 
Smith process  distribution dominates the direct contribution process 
when nonzero provisions are considered (lowest z = 2.S3). 
TABLE 10 
TRADEOFF ANALYSIS 
Smith Process Direct Contribution 
x y z x y 
With 21.3 so 7 8.9 13 
Unanimity (97,3) (S7.S) 
Without 19 .7 67 62 4.7 100 
Unanimity (9S) (32.0) 
x = mean level (efficiency) for success periods. 
y percent of success periods. 
z 
67 
60 
· 1I
z = percent of success periods with at least one bankruptcy , 
The numbers in parentheses are the associated mean efficiency 
levels. 
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SP 
TABLE 11 
TEST ON PROPORTION OF FAILURES BY PROCESS• 
z = 1.56 
a = 0 , 06 
z = 4.13 
a '" 0 , 00 
p a2 
DCC 
z = 5.00 
a '" 0 . 00 
z = 1.25 
a "' 0 . 00 
z = 3. 15 
a "' 0 . 00 
*The 95 percent confidence intervals for the proportion of failures
(p) are : 
SPU - ( ,31 � p i  .69) DCU - (,68 i p i  .96) SP - (.16 i p i  .48 ) , 
a, A normal approximation to the binomial is used to test 
Ha : P1 = P2.
b ,  Using a contingency table to test failure rate of SPU 
failure rate SP , we obtain x2(1) = 1.81.
c, Using a contingency table to test failure rate of DCU 
failure rate DC, we obtain X2(1) = 47.61.
TABLE 12 
WILCOXON RANK TEST FOR NONZERO PROVISION• 
F 
SPU 
SP 
DC 
SP 
z = 1.11 
a = 0 .13 
G 
DC 
z = 5.40 
a "' 0 , 00 
z = 6.20 
a "' 0 , 00 
•confidence Intervals for Smith Process are
SPU (19.3 � µ i 23.4 ) 
SP (17.2 i µ < 22.2 ) 
DCU 
z = 2. 64 (T 
a = 0 . 04 
z = 2. 53 (T 
a = 0 . 006 
z = 1. 69 (T 
a = 0.65 
t-test for equal means SPU , SP yields t = 1.2. However F-test for 
equal variances yields F = 3.46. The modified t = 1.30. 
6 )  
8 )  
3 )  
Conclusion 14. .unanimity reduces the effect of bankruptcies.
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Support. In Table 13 we find that the loss per period in SP (165�) is 
greater than in SPU (25�). Similarly, for DC, the loss per period 
(68�) is greater than in DCU (11�). If average loss per bankruptcy is 
weighted by the proportion of bankruptcy periods, i.e., 
f LL lossi] [number of bankruptcy periods l 
t number of periods } • 
where i indexes losses, then we find the same ranking being 
maintained : SP= 1181, SPU = 25¢, DC = 57¢, DCU = 6¢. 
The role of time and replication proved to be important in the 
overall performance of the mechanism, Hence it is natural to check 
for any effects on the success periods. As above our comparisons 
involve the first two periods (early periods) vs. periods three and 
greater (late periods) , 
The following conclusion suggests that a tradeoff between the 
efficiency given success and the rate of success may exist over time 
as well as across mechanisms. 
Conclusion 15. 
(i) Considering only successful periods of SP and SPU the levels 
are lower during the first two periods than in later periods. 
The differences are not significant. 
(ii) The success rate goes down (up) with replications in SPU (DCU) 
Process 
SPU 
SP 
DCU 
DC 
TABLE 13 
MEASURES OF BANKRUPTCY BY PROCESS• 
Magnitudes of Bankruptcy 
(a) (b) (c) = (a)/(b) 
Average Number of Weighted Loss 
Loss Participants Suffering per Occurrence 
per Period ($ )  Loss in Loss Period of Loss ( $ )  
0.25 1.0 0.25 
1.65 1.4 1.18 
0.11 2.0 0.06 
0.68 1.2 0.57 
but not significantly, 
( iii) The success rate goes down in SP with replication. 
Support. 
( i ) Table 14 shows that mean difference of provision levels from 
later vs. early periods is .30 for SPU and 1.60 for SP. The 
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z-scores (Table 15) , however, are z = .25 ( a = .49) for SPU and 
z = .66 ( a  
z = .71 ( a  
.25) for SP. In Table 14 the sign test yields 
.24) for SPU and z = 1.60 (a = .055) for SP. 
( ii )- ( iii) The mean difference of the failure rates from later vs. 
early periods is .14 for SPU and .36 for SP. Table 15 provides 
the test of equal proportion of failures in periods one and two 
and periods three on, the z = ,74 (a = .23) for SPU, z = 2.11 
(a = .017) for SP, and z = -.70 ( a  = .24) for DCU. 
4. Strategic Use of Unanimity 
Unanimity changes the set of Nash equilibria in the game 
representations of the mechanisms so reasons exist to suspect that it 
will influence the strategies used by participants. The next two 
results identify some of the effects of unanimity on individual 
behavior. The first result suggests that unanimity encourages higher 
bidding by removing any risk of loss associated with higher bids. The 
higher bidding activity increases the likelihood that costs will be 
covered in the Smith process and increases the efficiency level of 
success periods in the direct contribution mechanism. The second 
result indicates that unanimity can be used as a bargaining tool in 
TABLE 14 
THE EFFECT OF REPETITION ON THE PROCESS• 
Mean Provision x > 0 
Process Periods 1 and 2 Periods 3+ 
SPU 
SP 
DCU 
DC 
21.1 
18. 9
13.7 
8.0 
21.4 
20.5 
6.6 
3.3 
Failure Rate 
Periods 1 and 2 Periods 3+ 
.42 
.08 
.92 
0 
.56 
.44 
.82 
0 
•Sign Test (Equal Probability of Movement for Provision Levels ) Yields:
SPU DCU 
z = 0.77 
z = 0.71 
z = 0.23 
e.o. p. 
x ) 0 
x }. 0 
(x }. 0) z = 1.09 (x }. 0) 
(x ) 0) z = 1.60 (x ) 0) 
(e. o.p. ) z = 1.63 (e. o.p. ) 
end of period project levels 
success periods allocations 
all periods allocations 
SP 
z -2.82 (trials ) 
z -1.21 (e. o. p. )
DC 
z = -2.83 
SPU 
SP 
DCU 
TABLE 15 
TEST OF REPETITION EFFECT
Period 1 and 2 vs. Periods 3+ 
Successful 
Provision 
Levels a 
z = 0.25 
a = 0.49 
z = 0.66 
a = 0.25 
z = 2.40 
a '" 0.008 
Failureb
Rate 
z = 0.74c
a = 0.23 
z = 2 . lld 
a = 0.017 
z = -.1oe 
a = 0.24 
a. Test based on Wilcoxon Rank Sum where the null hypothesis is that
repetition does not matter, and the alternative is that Periods 1 and
2 dominate Periods 3+. 
b. Test based on normal approximation to binomial to test difference
in failure rate with the alternative hypothesis being that the failure 
rate grows with repetition. The sample sizes are small so that the 
normal approximation may not hold. 
c. Using a contingency table to2test failure rate periods 1 and 2failure rate periods 3+ yields X (1) = .14. 
d.
e. 
x2 c1 >
X2(1)
1.39 from contingency table. 
1.20 from contingency table. 
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which participants attempt to benefit themselves at the possible 
expense of others. 
Conclusion 16. The sum of bids in both mechanisms tends to be larger 
with unanimity than without. 
Support. Testing whether the sum of bids come from the same 
distribution with or without unanimity we obtain z = 6.03 ( a � .00) 
for SPU vs. SP and z = 2.95 (a = .002) for DCU vs. DC from Table 16. 
Applying a parametric test for the equality of means of sum of bids we 
find t = 4.88 ( a � .00) for SPU vs. SP and t = 2.58 ( a = ,01) for DCU 
vs. DC. 
Conclusion 17. The following strategic uses of unanimity are evident. 
(i) voting no with positive profits occurs on nonfinal trials but 
never on last .trials for SPU ; 
(ii) no votes with positive profits are followed by lower bids; 
(iii) the addition of unanimity in the Smith process pushes the 
process to the final trials. 
Support. 
Table 17 shows that 46 (67) percent of the no votes in SPU 
(DCU) were registered by participants making positive profits. 
Furthermore, 
(i) 35 (70) percent of the participants in SPU (DCU) voted no with 
positive profits at least once. However, participants never 
SPU 
DCU 
. 
t = 4 .  88
SP 
TABLE 16 
TEST ON SUM OF BIDS 
DC 
a "" 0 . 0  
a "' 0 , 0  I z = 6 . 03 �-�----
z = 2 . 95 a = .002 
t = 2 . 5 87 a = . 01 
TABLE 17 
STRATEGIC USE OF UNANIMITY RULE BY INDIVIDUALS 
Percent of individuals voting 
no with positive profits 
No votes with positive profits 
as a percent of total no votes 
Number of no votes on last 
trial of period with positive 
profits 
Percent of individuals who 
never vote no with positive 
profits if previously such a 
strategy resulted in lower 
profits 
SPU 
( 21/60)  - 3 5  
( 3 5/76 )  - 46 
0 
( 11/14 )  - 7 9  
DCU 
( 42 / 60 )  - 7 0  
( 26 9/ 401 ) - 6 1  
( 15 / 42 )  - 3 6  
•Eleven out of twenty-two last trials had a t  least one no vote from an
individual making positive profits. 
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vote no with positive profits on the last trial of a period in 
SPU ( 1 9  no votes were registered on the last trial of a period 
in DCU by individuals making positive profits), 
(ii) Table 18 shows that 71 percent of those individuals voting no 
with positive profit reduce their bids for the next trial. 
(iii) From Table 1 9  we notice that SPU uses all the possible trials 
in 82 percent of periods while SP has only 47 percent of the 
periods using all the trials. 
VI. CONCLUDING REl-!ARKS
From a practical point of view the experiments were successful 
in a negative sort of way. The Smith process does not reliably 
deliver public goods decisions at near 100 percent levels of 
efficiency, In efficiency terms the performance of the process will 
be sensitive to the parametric environment. In particular the 
performance of the mechanism decreases with repeated use rather than 
increases as one might have hoped. This fact bears importantly on the 
space station research project. A more reliable process must be found 
before we proceed with an application at the practical/political level 
of analysis. 
On a more positive note the Smith process performs much better 
than a direct contribution process. Both the performance over all 
periods is better and the performance over time is better. These 
experiments leave no doubt that the quality of public goods decisions 
can be substantially affected by the choice of mechanism. 
Surprisingly, unanimity decreased the efficiency with which either 
TABLE 1 8  
CHANGE IN  BIDS AFTER AGREEMENT OR FAILURE 
Percent of bids that do not 
increase if there is a no vote 
Percent of bids that decrease 
if there is a no vote 
Percent of bids that do not 
increase if there is a no vote 
or end of period (e.o.p. )  
Percent of bids that decrease 
if there is a no vote or 
e.o.p. 
Percent of bids that decrease 
if individual voted no with 
loss 
Percent of bids that decrease 
if individual voted no with 
positive profit 
Percent of bids that do not 
increase if cost not covered 
at e.o.p. 
SP 
83 
62 
82 
SPU 
7 4  
43 
82 
51  
93 
71  
50  
TABLE 1 9  
PROPORTION OF TRIALS USED B Y  PROCESSES 
All Trials Agreement on 
Used Last Trial 
SPU ( 23/ 28)  - 82% ( 9/ 23 )  _ 3 9%  
ISP ( 14/30)  - 47% ( 5/ 14 )  - 3 6% 
DCU ( 22/23 ) - 96% I ( 2/22 )  - 9% I 
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mechanism functioned. This result is directly counter to expectations 
formed from data and conjectures found in the literature . 
A puzzle remains about the reason for the relatively good 
performance of the Smith process. Individuals do not seem to be 
revealing Lindahl prices as one might expect from studying previous 
work. Some support exists for a Nash gradient response model. 
Analysis of the data also yields support for an ad hoc model of 
individual decisions. This lack of resolve and the high variances in 
errors suggest that more research is necessary on this issue. 
A tradeoff in performance qualities can be detected. Much of 
the low levels of efficiencies in the Smith process can be attributed 
to a low success rate. When groups do not cover cost and attain an 
agreement within a prespecified number of trials, the chosen level of 
the public good is zero by default. Unanimity has the property of 
decreasing the success rate and increasing the efficiency given that a 
success occurs. This latter tendency, however, is not statistically 
significant. Part of the failures when unanimity is added can be 
understood in terms of bankruptcy avoidance and therefore perhaps the 
failures are not a dead weight loss due to unanimity. Unanimity does 
remove a bankruptcy problem. However, unanimity does more than 
eliminate bankruptcies because it is a tool that can be used 
strategically. Several of the conclusions of the paper are devoted to 
an attempt to detect such strategic behavior. 
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APPENDIX A 
SPU 
INSTRUCTIONS 
3 1  
You are about to participate in a decision process in which 
one of numerous competing alternatives will be chosen. This is part 
of a study intended to provide insight into certain features of 
decision processes ,  I f  you follow the instructions carefully and make 
good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money. You 
will be paid in cash . 
This decision process will proceed as a series of periods or 
days during which a project level will be determined and financed . 
The "level" can be at zero "units" or more, the exact level of which 
must be determined. Attached to the instructions you will find a 
sheet, which describes the value to you of decisions made during the 
process, called the Redemption Value Sheet . You are not to reveal 
this information to anyone . It is your own private information. 
During each period a level of the project will be determined. 
For the first unit provided during a period you will receive the 
amount listed in row 1 of the Redemption Value Sheet . If a second 
unit is also provided during the period, you will receive 'the 
additional amount listed in row 2 of the Redemption Value Sheet . If a 
third unit is provided, you will receive, in addition to the two 
previous amounts, the amount listed in row 3 ,  etc . As you can see, 
your individual total payment is computed as a sum of the redemption 
values of specific units . (These totals of redemption values are 
tabulated for your convenience on the right-hand side of the page . )  
The earnings each period, which are yours to keep, are the 
differences between the total of redemption values of units of the 
project provided and your individual expenditures on the project . All 
values are stated in francs and can be converted into cash at a rate 
of �� francs per dollar at the end of the experiment . Suppose, for 
example, your Redemption Value Sheet was as below and two units were 
provided . 
Project Level 
(Units) 
1 
2 
3 
REDEMPTION VALUE SHEET 
Redemption Value 
of Specific Units 
(Francs) 
2 500 
1 500 
1000 
Total Redemption 
Value of All Units 
(Francs) 
2 500 
4000 
5000 
Your redemption value for the two units would be 4000 and your 
earnings would be computed by subtracting your individual expenditures 
from this amount .  If 2 . 5  units were provided, the redemption value 
would be determined by the redemption values of the first and second 
unit plus one half of the third unit, that is, 
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2500 + 1 500 + ( . 5 ) 1000 4500 . 
Each unit of the project costs __ francs . Hence , total 
cost for a project is __ times the project size . Your portion of 
total project cost for a period is determined from the decisions that 
result from a series of trial bids using the following process (refer 
to the period Record Sheet in your folder for recording the results of 
each trial) • 
At the beginning of a trial in a period you will select a bid 
expressed in francs and a project level expressed in whole numbers . 
During the trial you will enter your bid choice in the second row of 
the Record Sheet, your proposed project level in the third row of the 
Record Sheet, and both of these numbers on the appropriate choice card 
contained in your folder .  After the choice cards are collected, the 
sum of all the bids and the average proposed project level will be 
displayed on the blackboard . Record the sum of the bids in row 1 and 
the average proposed project level in row 7 of your Record Sheet. 
Your potential price per unit of the project is the difference 
between the unit cost of the project and the sum of all others' bids. 
Thus, to obtain your potential price per unit of the project subtract 
row 1 from your bid in row 2 of the Record Sheet. Suppose, for 
example , you were to bid 200 francs and the sum of all bids is 1000 ,
your potential price would then be 1 3 00 - ( 1000 - 200) = 500 francs. 
Your potential payment is your potential price times the average 
proposed project level. This number should be entered in row 9 of the 
Record Sheet . Hence, if the average proposed project level were 8
units then your potential cost for 8 units from the above example 
would be 8 x 500 = 4000 francs. 
The potential value to you of the trial decision is obtained 
from your Redemption Value Sheet by finding the row for the proposed 
average project level and then placing the number found in the Total 
Redemption Value column in row 8 of the Record Sheet . Your possible 
earnings of the trial decision is the difference between your Total 
Redemption Value and your cost of the average proposed project level. 
This number should be placed in row 1 0  of the Record Sheet. Thus, if 
your Total Redemption Value for 8 units were 6500 francs, your 
potential earnings from the above example would be 6500 - 4000 = 2 500
francs . 
In order for your potential earnings on a given trial to be 
awarded for the period, TWO events must occur . 
1 .  Each participant 's bid must equal his/her potential price . If the 
sum of all bids exceeds the unit cost __ of the project, all 
participants get a rebate in proportion to their bid such that the 
new bid of each is equal to his/her potential price . 
2 .  All participants vote "yes " on their voting pad . If any 
participant votes "no," then the decision will not be finalized 
and the group will go to the next trial. 
A maximum of trials for period 1 and __ trials for 
all subsequent periods will be permitted . If the process stops by 
these rules the earnings in your agreement trial for the period will 
be yours to keep . If no agreement is reached for the period as 
defined above you will obtain no earnings for the period . 
The Redemption Value Sheet is not the same for all 
participants . Feel free to earn as much as you can . Are there any 
questions? 
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1 .  
2 .  
3 .  
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Review Questions 
The additional redemption value for the ninth unit is __ • Your 
total redemption value for a project of size 3 units is �� ; for 
a project of size 17 . 5  units is __ ; for a project of size 3 0 . 1
units is 
Suppose there were three individuals in the experiment and the 
following bids and project levels were tendered . 
1 
Bid = 100 
Project 
Level = 20
2 
Bid 50
Project 
Level = 1 0
3 
Bid 1 50
Project 
Level = 6
Then the sum of bids is 
level is 
and the average proposed project 
Suppose the total of others ' bids (not including yours) is 1200
francs and the average proposed project level (including your 
proposal) is 1 5 .
(i) Your total redemption value for the average project level is 
(ii) If you were to have bid 100 francs would the group proceed 
to vote? __ • Your potential price would be and 
potential payment __ in this example. 
(iii) If you were to have bid 200 francs would the group proceed 
to vote? __ • Since costs are more than covered your 
rebate factor would be . 93 . The total sum of revised bids 
would be 1300 francs, your revised bid would be __ , and 
your potential payment __ in this example. 
(iv) If you were to have bid 50 francs would the group proceed to 
vote? __ • Your potential price would be __ and your 
potential payment __ in this example. 
SP 
INSTRUCTIONS 
3 5  
You are about to participate in a decision process in which 
one of numerous competing alternatives will be chosen. This is part 
of a study intended to provide insight into certain features of 
decision processes. If you follow the instructions carefully and make 
good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money. You 
will be paid in cash. 
This decision process will proceed as a series of periods or 
days during which a project level will be determined and financed. 
The "level" can be at zero "units" or more, the exact level of which 
must be determined. Attached to the instructions you will find a 
sheet, which describes the value to you of decisions made during the 
process, called the Redemption Value Sheet. You are not to reveal 
this information to anyone . It is your own private information. 
During each period a level of the project will be determined . 
For the first unit provided during a period you will receive the 
amount listed in row 1 of the Redemption Value Sheet. If a second 
unit is also provided during the period, you will receive the 
additional amount listed in row 2 of the Redemption Value Sheet. If a 
third unit is provided, you will receive, in addition to the two 
previous amounts, the amount listed in row 3 ,  etc. As you can see, 
your individual total payment is computed as a sum of the redemption 
values of specific units. (These totals of redemption values are 
tabulated for your convenience on the right-hand side of the page .) 
The earnings each period, which are yours to keep, are the 
differences between the total of redemption values of units of the 
project provided and your individual expenditures on the project. All 
values are stated in francs and can be converted into cash at a rate 
of __ francs per dollar at the end of the experiment. Suppose, for 
example, your Redemption Value Sheet was as below and two units were 
provided. 
Project Level 
(Units) 
1 
2 
3 
REDEMPTION VALUE SHEET 
Redemption Value 
of Specific Units 
(Francs) 
2 500 
1500 
1000 
Total Redemption 
Value of All Units 
(Francs) 
2 500 
4000 
5000 
Your redemption value for the two units would be 4000 and your 
earnings would be computed by subtracting your individual expenditures 
from this amount. If 2 . 5  units were provided, the redemption value 
would be determined by the redemption values of the first and second 
unit plus one half of the third unit, that is, 
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2500 + 1 500 + ( . 5 ) 1000 4500 . 
Each unit of the project cost ___ francs. Hence, total cost 
for a project is __ times the project size. Your portion of total 
project cost for a period is determined from the decisions that result 
from a series of trial bids using the following process (refer to the 
period Record Sheet in your folder for recording the results of each 
trial l . 
At the beginning of a trial in a period you will select a bid 
expressed in francs and a project level expressed in whole numbers. 
During the trial you will enter your bid choice in the second row of 
the Record Sheet, your proposed project level in the third row of the 
Record Sheet, and both of these numbers on the appropriate choice card 
contained in your folder. After the choice cards are collected, the 
sum of all the bids and the average proposed project level will be 
displayed on the blackboard. Record the sum of the bids in row 1 and 
the average proposed project level in row 7 of your Record Sheet. 
Your potential price per unit of the project is the difference 
between the unit cost of the project and the sum of all others ' bids. 
Thus , to obtain your potential price per unit of the project subtract 
row 1 from your bid in row 2 of the Record Sheet. Suppose, for 
example, you were to bid 200 francs and the sum of all bids is 1000 ,
your potential price would then be 1300 - ( 1000 - 200) = 500 francs. 
Your potential payment is your potential price times the average 
proposed project level. This number should be entered in row 9 of the 
Record Sheet. Hence , if the average proposed project level were 8
units then your potential cost for 8 units from the above example 
would be 8 x 500 = 4000 francs. 
The potential value to you of the trial decision is obtained 
from your Redemption Value Sheet by finding the row for the proposed 
average project level and then placing the number found in the Total 
Redemption Value column in row 8 of the Record Sheet • .  Your possible 
earnings of the trial decision is the difference between your Total 
Redemption Value and your cost of the average proposed project level. 
This number should be placed in row 1 0  of the Record Sheet. Thus , if 
your Total Redemption Value for 8 units were 6500 francs, your 
potential earnings from the above example would be 6500 - 4000 = 2 500
francs. 
In order for your potential earnings on a given trial to be 
awarded for the period, the coat must be covered; that is, the sum of 
the bids must be greater than or equal to __ francs. If the sum of 
the bids exceeds the unit cost __ francs of the project, all 
participants get a rebate in proportion to their bid such that the sum 
of the new bids is equal to __ francs. 
A maximum of __ trials for period 1 and __ trials for 
all subsequent periods will be permitted. If the process stops by 
these rules the earnings in our agreement trial for the period will be 
yours to keep. If no agreement is reached for the period as defined 
above you will obtain no earnings for the period. Each participant 
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will be given some initial working capital __ francs which will be 
paid in addition to any period earnings at the end of the experiment. 
The Redemption Value Sheet is not the same for all 
participants. Feel free to earn as much as you can. Are there any 
questions? 
1 .  
2 .  
3 .  
3 8  
Review Questions 
The additional redemption value 
total redemption values for all 
is ��; for a project of size 
of size 3 0 , l  units is 
for the ninth unit is Your 
units of a project of size 3 units 
17 . S  units is ��; for a project 
Suppose there were three individuals in the experiment and the 
following bids and project levels were tendered. 
Bid 100
Project 
Level = 20
Then the sum of bids is 
level is 
2 
Bid s o
Project 
Level = 10
3 
Bid = l SO
Project 
Level = 6
and the average proposed project 
Suppose the total of others ' bids (not including yours) is 1200
francs and the average proposed project level (including your 
proposal) is l S .
(i) Your total redemption value for the average project level is 
(ii) If you were to have bid 100 francs would the process stop? 
Your potential price would be �� and potential 
payment �� in this example. 
(iii) If you were to have bid 200 francs would the process stop? 
Since costs are more than covered your rebate factor 
would be . 93 .  The total sum of revised bids would be 1300
francs, your revised bid would be �� · your potential 
price �� • and your potential payment �� in this 
example. 
(iv) If you were to have bid SO francs would the process stop? 
Your potential price would be �� and potential 
payment �� in this example. 
DCU 
INSTRUCTIONS 
3 9  
You are about to participate in a decision process in which 
one of numerous competing alternatives will be chosen. This is part 
of a study intended to provide insight into certain features of 
decision processes. If you follow the instructions carefully and make 
good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money , You 
will be paid in cash. 
This decision process will proceed as a series of periods or 
days during which a project level will be determined and financed. 
The "level" can be at zero "units" or more, the exact level of which 
must be determined. Attached to the instructions you will find a 
sheet, which describes the value to you of decisions made during the 
process, called the Redemption Value Sheet. You � not to reveal 
this information to anyone. It is your own private information. 
During each period a level of the project will be determined. 
For the first unit provided during a period you will receive the 
amount listed in row 1 of the Redemption Value Sheet. If a second 
unit is also provided during the period, you will receive the 
additional amount listed in row 2 of the Redemption Value Sheet. If a 
third unit is provided, you will receive, in addition to the two 
previous amounts, the amount listed in row 3 ,  etc. As you can see, 
your individual total payment is computed as a sum of the redemption 
values of specific units. (These totals of redemption values are 
tabulated for your convenience on the right-hand side of the page.) 
The earnings each period, which are yours to keep, are the 
differences between the total of redemption values of units of the 
project provided and your individual expenditures on the project. All 
values are stated in cents. Suppose, for example, your Redemption 
Value Sheet was as below and two units were provided. 
REDEMPTION VALUE SHEET 
Project Level Redemption Value Total Redemption 
(Units) of Specific Units Value of All Units 
1 600 600 
2 soo 1100 
3 400 l SOO 
Your redemption value for the two units would be 1100 and your 
earnings would be computed by subtracting your individual expenditures 
from this amount. If 2 . S  units were provided, the redemption value 
would be determined by the redemption values of the first and second 
units plus one half of the third unit, that is, 
600 + soo + ( . S ) 400 = 1300.  
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Each unit of the project cost Hence, total cost for a 
project is times the project size. Your portion of total 
project cost for a period is determined from the decisions that result 
from a series of trial bids using the following process (refer to the 
period Record Sheet in your folder for recording the results of each 
trial), 
At the beginning of a trial in a period you will select a bid 
expressed in cents and place that number on your bid card and row 3 of 
your period Record Sheet. After the bid cards are collected they will 
be summed up and divided by __ to obtain a proposed project level, 
which will be displayed on the board. Record the proposed project 
level in row 1 of your period Record Sheet. 
Your potential earnings from the proposed project is the 
difference between your total redemption value from the proposed 
project and your bid. The potential value to you of the trial 
decision is obtained from your Redemption Value Sheet by finding the 
row for the proposed project level and then placing the number found 
in the Total Redemption Value column in row 2 of the Record Sheet. 
Thus , your possible earnings of the trial decision is the difference 
between your Total Redemption Value (row 2 )  and your bid (row 3 ) .
This number should be placed in row 4 of the Record Sheet. 
In order for your potential earnings on a given trial to be 
awarded for the period, all participants would have to vote "yes" on 
their voting pad. If any participant votes "no," then the decision 
will not be finalized and the group will go to the next trial. 
A maximum of __ trials for period 1 and __ trials for 
all subsequent periods will be permitted. If the process stops by 
these rules the earnings in your agreement trial for the period will 
be yours to keep. If no agreement is reached for the period as 
defined above you will obtain no earnings for the period. 
The Redemption Value Sheet is not the same for all 
participants . Feel free to earn as much as you can. Are there any 
questions? 
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Review Questions 
1 .  True or false. My earnings per period are the difference between 
the total of redemption values for the units of the project 
determined less the project cost per unit: 
2 .  For the ninth unit of the project, the additional redemption value 
for that specific unit is 
My total ,of redemption values for all units for a project of size 3
units is for a project of size 17 . S  units is __ ; for a 
project of size 3 0 . l  units is 
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APPENDIX B 
4 3  
DATA FILE STRUCTURE* 
Field Location by Mechanism 
Data Ty� SPU SP DCU DC 
Period 1 1 1 2 
Trial 2 2 2 
Subject i :  
Bid Response 3i 2i+l 2i+l 1+2 
Project Level 3 1+1 2 1+2 
Vote 3 1+2 - 21+2 
Sum of Bids 3 3  23 
Proposed Project Level 3 4  24  23 1 3 
Overall No Votes 
Per Trial 3 5 - 24 
•Subjects 1-5 are the high payoff participants and subjects 6-10 are
the low payoff participants. For SPU and SP bids are stated in francs 
( 1000 francs = tl . 00)  while bids in DC and DCU are in cents . 
Note : The sum of bids, proposed project level, and overall vote data 
presented are the actual numbers placed on the board as public 
information. Discrepancies due to incorrect calculation are denoted 
with footnotes indicating the correct calculation. 
SPU 
Exper iment 
l l 1 00 20 0 100 20 0 400 20 0 420 4 0 300 14 0 200 7 0 50 28 1 J 40 17 0 500 10 1 130 5 0 2340 J 4 . 5  2 
33 0 7 6  2 5  0 200 8 0 J 40 6 0 J 03 1  22. 8 0 
34 0 J OO 22 0 50 20 0 J 3 0  5 0 9 83 2 2 . 0  0 
1 5  0 1 3 2  J 8  0 80 20 0 J 40 5 0 1 3 6 2  1 8. 8 0 
3 J  0 J l 6  20 0 JOO J O  0 J 3 0  0 941 2 4 . 6  0 
3J 0 J J6 20 0 70 JO 0 J 40 6 0 9 8J 2 5 . 8 O 
3 J  0 1 1 6  20 0 300 3 0 J 50 6 0 1 26 1  23 . 3  0 
3 1  0 J 26 20 0 550 J O  0 J 50 6 0 J 5J l  23 . 5  0 
30 0 1 J 6  20 0 200 JO 0 1 40 6 0 l 0 6 J8 24 . 4  O 
33 o 1 1 6  20 o 300 30 o J 50 6 o J J 66 3 2 . 6b o 
33 0 1 1 6  20 0 7 00 32 l J 50 7 0 J 5 1 1  27 . J  2 
34 0 1 16 20 0 1 50 32 0 J 50 5 0 94l c 27 . 7  O 
34 0 1 3 2  1 8  0 300 32 0 J 6 0  4 0 1 2J 2  24. 3 0 
34 0 J l 6 20 0 200 32 0 J 40 4 0 976 26 . 3  0 
34 0 1 1 7  1 9  0 400 32 0 J 6 0  0 1 2 87 2 4 . 4  0 
l 2 1 00 20 0 1 0 0  30 0 2 1 0  21 0 0 40 0 1 00 30 0 1 00 15 0 5 
l 3 1 00 20 0 1 00 30 0 1 90 23 0 1 0 0  30 0 1 50 26 0 50 10 0 1 3  
l 4 200 20 0 1 1 0  3 5  0 2 0 0  1 5  0 2 0 0  3 0  0 1 50 2 6  0 1 00 4 0 5 0  
2 l 20 3 5  0 7 0  4 0  0 1 90 27 0 J 50 40 0 130 2 8  0 1 0  1 0  0 2 5  
2 2  5 0  3 5 0 80  40 0 200 25 0 1 50 40 0 1 50 26 0 0  25 0 2 5 
2 3 50 35 0 80 40 0 230 8 0 1 5 0  40 0 1 6 0  25 0 0 25 0 25 
2 4 40 3 5 0 80 40 0 23 5 0 0 1 40 40 0 I 50 26 0 0 27 0 40 
3 l 0 30 0 100 40 0 2 1 0  0 0 1 40 60 0 1 3 0  28 0 0 20 0 1 5  
3 2 0 3 5  0 1 10 40 0 210 0 0 1 40 1 40 0 130 2 8  0 0 30 0 1 0  
3 3 0 3 8 0 50 40 0 2 1 0  0 1 1 40 40 0 J 40 27 0 0 3 4 0 5 
3 4 0 35 0 1 0 0  30 0 1 6 5  0 0 1 3 0  60 0 1 40 27 0 0 34 0 0 
3 5 70 25 0 1 00 30 0 1 50 0 0 1 50 40 0 J 50 26 0 0 34 0 0 
4 l 0 25 0 1 00 30 0 1 50 0 0 1 40 60 0 1 3 0  2 8  0 0 30 0 0 
4 2 0 25 0 J 50 0 0 1 7 0  0 0 1 40 80 0 1 50 26 0 0 25 0 0 
4 3 J 5  22 0 1 50 0 0 1 7 5  0 0 1 40 1 00 0 1 50 26 0 0 34 0 0 
4 4 20 20 0 200 0 0 J 7 6  0 0 1 40 200 0 1 50 26 0 0 25 0 0 
4 5 1 00 1 5  0 1 50 0 0 1 7 5  0 0 200 30 0 l BO  23 0 0 34 0 0 
34 0 1 1 7  1 9  0 500 1 6 0  3 0 J 407 24. 3 
34 0 J l 6  1 9  0 1 00 5 0 1 6 0  0 J 06 2  33 . 0  0 
3 4 0 J 3 2 17 0 200 0 J 6 0 0 J 2 97 J 5. 9 0 
a. 1051 
h .  3 6 . 2  
c .  951 
1 1 80 
l 2 BO 
3 BO 
4 90 
5 90 
l 6 90 
l 7 1 00 
l 8 1 50 
2 l 90 
2 2 90 
2 3 90 
2 4 95 
2 5 1 0 0  
3 l BO 
3 2 85 
3 3 BO 
3 4 90 
3 5 95 
4 J BO 
4 2 BO 
4 3 80 
4 4 85 
4 5 90 
5 1 BO 
5 2 90 
5 3 90 
5 4 90 
5 5 95 
a .  26 . 1  
h .  1 4 0 5  
SPU 
Experiment 
20 O 200 21 O O 40 0 1 3 0  20 0 260 20 l J 50 1 5  0 1 00 20 0 J 3 0  J O  0 200 4 J OO 30 0 J 3 50 20 2 
40 0 200 21 0 50 40 0 1 40 25 0 200 30 0 J OO 20 0 1 00 25 0 100 5 0 250 5 ' 0 50 22 0 1 27 0  23 . 3  0 
40 0 200 21 0 1 0  40 0 1 40 25 0 250 30 0 l J O  20 0 1 00 25 0 J OO 0 1 00 20 0 20 30 0 J l l O  25. 2 0 
40 0 200 21 0 25 40 0 J 40 30 0 2 50 30 0 1 00 1 8  0 1 1 0  25 0 J O O  0 0 J 3 5  20 0 50 2 2  0 J 200 2 4 . 6  0 
40 0 200 2J 0 1 0 0  40 0 1 45 30 0 3 7 5  5 l 1 20 20 0 1 25 25 0 1 00 0 0 1 3 5  20 0 1 00 30 0 1 490 23 . J  J 
40 o 200 21 o o 40 o 1 45 30 o 200 40 o 1 1 5  20 o 1 25 20 o 90 o o J 25 20 o 7 5  30 o J l6 5  24. �' o 
40 0 200 21 0 20 40 0 J 45 30 0 1 7 0  40 0 J 2 5  30 0 1 50 1 5  0 J OO 0 0 1 3 5  20 0 JOO J 0 J 245 23 . 7  0 
40 0 225 20 0 20 40 0 1 50 30 0 1 80  40 0 130 25 0 1 50 J 5  0 JOO 0 0 J 50 21 0 J 50 J7 0 1305b 24. 8 0 
40 0 250 25 0 l 0 40 0 J 50 30 0 J 7 5 40 0 1 40 J 8 0 1 25 1 8  0 50 0 0 1 2 5  23 0 5 3 0 0 1 1 20 26 . 4 0 
40 0 250 25 0 20 40 0 J 50 30 0 J 7 5  40 0 J 50 20 0 1 2 5  1 8  0 BO 0 0 J 3 5  20 0 3 0  3 0  0 1 20 5  26 , 3  0 
40 0 250 25 0 25 40 0 1 50 30 0 1 7 0  40 0 J 50 20 0 1 25 1 5  0 90 0 0 J 2 5 20 0 50 34 0 J 2 25 26 . 4  0 
40 0 250 25 0 40 40 0 1 6 0  30 0 J 6 0  40 0 1 50 30 0 1 50 1 5  0 90 0 0 1 2 5 20 0 5 34 0 J 22 5  27 . 4  0 
40 0 250 25 0 30 40 0 J 6 0  30 0 J 7 0  40 0 J 6 0  20 0 1 7 0  5 0 l J O  0 0 J 3 5  20 0 50 3 4  0 J 3 3 5  25. 4 0 
40 0 250 30 0 0 40 0 1 6 0  30 0 1 6 0  40 0 1 40 20 0 1 3 0  10 0 J OO 0 0 J 2 5 2J 0 5 34 0 J J 50 26 . 5  0 
40 0 250 20 O 25 40 0 160 30 0 J 50 40 0 1 3 0  3 2  0 J 50 J 0 J OO 0 0 1 3 5  30 0 3 0  3 4  0 J 2 J 5  26 . 7  0 
40 0 250 40 0 3 5  4 0  0 1 6 0  3 0  0 J 45 4 0  0 1 3 5  25 0 1 50 l 0 J OO 0 0 1 2 5  5 0 2 5  3 4  0 J 20 5  25 . 5  0 
40 0 250 40 0 40 40 0 1 6 0  30 0 1 50 l 0 1 55 40 l 1 40 1 5  0 1 3 5  0 0 1 3 5  J 0 50 34 0 J 3 0 5  24. 1 1 
40 0 250 40 0 50 40 0 1 6 0  30 0 1 6 0  30 0 J 3 5  25 0 1 50 0 1 3 5  0 0 1 2 5  1 9  0 60 34 0 J 3 2 0  25 . 9  0 
40 0 250 1 9  0 J O  40 0 1 90 35 0 1 40 40 0 J 40 20 0 1 40 0 J OO 0 0 50 25 0 30 34 0 J l 3 0  25 . 4  0 
40 0 250 J 5  0 1 50 40 J J 90 35 0 1 40 40 0 J 45 25 I J 50 0 J 05 0 0 1 3 5  5 0 20 34 0 J 3 6 5  23 . 5  2 
40 0 250 5 0 40 40 0 J 90 35 0 133 40 0 133 40 0 1 40 0 J 50 0 0 J OO 5 0 20 34 0 J 236 24 0 
40 0 250 0 50 40 0 1 90 3 5  0 130 40 0 1 45 26 0 1 50 0 J OO 5 0 1 3 5  5 0 25 34 0 J 26 0  2 2 . 7  0 
40 0 250 0 50 40 0 1 9 5  35 0 1 3 0  40 0 1 45 25 0 J 50 0 1 00 0 0 J 2 5 5 0 40 34 0 J 27 5  22 . 1  0 
40 0 250 0 0 40 0 200 35 0 1 20 40 0 1 40 28 0 J 50 0 0 34 0 JO J 5  0 20 34 0 970 26 . 8  0 
40 0 250 0 60 40 0 200 35 0 200 1 5  0 160 1 5  I 1 50 0 50 34 0 1 3 5  25 0 50 34 0 J 3 4 5  24 
40 0 250 0 55 40 0 J 95 35 0 200 1 5  0 130 25 0 1 50 0 50 34 0 J 3 5  I 0 40 34 0 1 2 95 2 2 . 6  0 
40 0 2 50 · 0 50 40 0 J 95 3 5 0 J BO 20 0 1 3 0  25 0 J 5o o 5o o 0 1 3 5  1 0 20 34 0 12 50 1 9 . 7 0 
40 0 250 I 0 60 40 0 200 35 0 160 40 0 J 45 25 0 1 50 0 60 0 0 1 3 5 I 0 50 34 0 1 3 05 2 1 . 7  0 
44 
SPU 
Exper iment 3 
400 40 1 470 6 1 1 50 1 5 0 l l 0  20 0 1 00 40 0 210 8 1 1 00 1 0 0 1 3 0  1 8 0 80 2 4 0 1 00 1 7 0 1 850 1 9 . 8 3 
2 1 3 0  40 0 3 80  6 0 1 0 0  17 0 1 2 5  20 0 100 40 0 1 00 10 0 1 20 l l  0 91 23 0 50 2 8  0 60 14 0 1 2 56 20.  9 0 
3 1 3 0  27 0 341 9 0 1 3 0  1 2  0 1 25 20 0 1 00 40 0 1 50 5 0 90 1 5  0 92 25 0 52 27 0 6 8  1 4  0 1 2.7 8 1 9 . 4  0 
4 130 27 0 41 8 2 1 1 45 1 5  0 1 3 0  20 0 100 40 0 1 7 5  5 1 1 0 0  13 0 93 3 4  1 54 27 0 7 6  20 0 1 42 1  20 . 3  3 
1 5 1 3 0  40 0 220 20 0 1 20 1 5  0 1 25 25 0 100 40 0 1 50 20 0 1 1 0  1 8  0 50 3 4  0 51 34 0 7 6  21 0 1 1 3 2  26 . 7  0 
1 6 1 3 0  30 0 209 21 0 1 3 0  1 5  0 1 3 0  25 0 1 00 40 0 1 00 20 0 1 4 5  13 0 55 3 4  0 53 34 0 84 26 0 1 1 36 2 5 . 8 0 
7 1 3 0  35 0 242 1 8  0 1 3 0  1 5  0 1 3 0  25 0 1 00 40 0 1 3 0  20 0 1 3 5  16 0 60 34 0 55 34 0 1 40 26 0 1 252 26 . 3  0 
8 1 3 0  3 5  0 1 54 26 0 1 44 1 5  0 130 28 0 1 00 40 0 130 2 0 1 40 7 0 64 34 0 57 34 0 1 40 32 0 1 1 89 2 5 . 3  0 
9 1 3 0  40 0 1 6 5  25 0 1 44 0 0 1 3 5  27 0 100 40 0 1 3 0  1 0 1 6 0  10 0 6 4  3 4  0 6 0  3 4  0 1 4 8 3 2  0 1 23 6  24. 3 0 
10 1 40 40 0 1 54 26 0 1 4 4  1 0  0 1 3 5  27 0 1 3 0  40 0 1 40 1 0 1 40 16 0 7 0  3 4  0 80 34 0 1 4 8  28 0 1 2 81 2 5 . 6  0 
2 1 1 3 0  40 0 1 54 26 0 1 40 10 0 1 3 5  27 0 1 00 30 0 1 40 20 0 1 40 1 5  0 70 3 4  0 52 34 0 1 56 25 0 1 21 7  26 . 1  0 
2 2 1 3 0  40 0 1 3 2  28 0 1 40 1 0  0 1 3 5  27 0 100 40 0 1 40 1 0 1 40 20 0 7 0  2 6  0 6 0  3 4  0 1 56 2 5  0 1 203 25 . 1  0 
2 3 1 3 0  40 0 1 3 2  28 0 1 7 0  1 0  0 1 3 5  27 0 1 00 40 0 1 50 l 0 1 40 10 0 7 5  0 0 7 0  3 4  0 1 7 2  2 5  0 1 27 4  21 . 5  0 
2 4 1 3 0  40 0 1 6 5  25 0 1 50 1 0  0 1 3 8  27 0 1 00 40 0 1 50 1 0 1 50 9 0 7 0  3 4  0 7 0  3 4  0 1 80  2 6  1 1 3 03 2 4 . 6 1 
2 5  1 3 0  40 0 1 6 5  2 5 0 1 4 5  1 0 0 1 3 8  27 0 1 3 0  40 0 1 50 1 0 1 40 25 0 7 1 3 4 0 7 0 3 4 0 1 7 2  27 1 1 3 l l  26 , 3 1 
3 1 130 40 0 1 6 5  25 0 1 3 0  20 0 1 3 8  27 0 1 00 40 0 1 00 1 0 1 3 5  25 0 7 1  3 4  0 6 9  3 4  0 1 6 4  26 0 1 20 2  27 . 2  0 
3 2 1 3 0  40 0 1 7 6  25 0 1 3 0  20 0 1 3 8  27 0 100 40 0 l l O  l 0 1 3 8  2 0 7 4  2 6  0 6 9  3 4  0 1 56 3 1  0 1 2 21 2 4 . 5 O 
3 3 1 40 40 0 1 6 5  25 0 1 3 0  24 0 1 3 8  27 0 1 00 40 0 1 3 0  l 0 1 40 28 0 76 25 0 7 5  34 0 1 6 4  30 0 1 2 5 8  27 . 4  0 
3 4  1 4 5  40 0 1 43 25 0 1 3 0  2 4 0 1 3 5  27 0 1 00 40 0 1 3 0  l 0 1 42 3 4 0 7 6 25 0 7 8 3 0 0 1 56 30 0 1 23 5  27 . 6 0 
3 5 1 45 40 0 1 6 5  25 0 1 3 0  24 0 1 3 5  26 0 130 30 0 1 40 1 0 1 55 34 0 7 8  0 0 80 2 0 1 56 29 0 1 3 1 4  21 . 1  0 
4 l 0 40 0 1 6 5  25 0 1 3 0  30 0 1 3 5  27 0 0 40 0 1 3 0  1 0 1 3 5  20 0 7 8 21 0 80 34 0 1 56 30 0 1 0 0 9  26 . 8 0 
4 2 1 3 0  40 0 1 5 4  25 0 1 3 0  30 0 1 3 1  27 0 0 40 0 1 3 0  1 0 1 3 5  24 0 80 0 0 80 34 0 1 56 32 0 1 1 26 2 5 . 3  0 
4 3 1 40 40 0 99 3 1  0 13 0 3 5 0 13 l 27 0 0 40 0 1 40 l 0 13 5 24 0 80 0 0 85 3 4 0 1 56 3 2 0 l 0 96 26 • 4 0 
4 4 1 40 40 0 1 21 31 0 1 3 0  35 0 1 3 1  27 0 0 40 0 1 40 3 4  0 1 40 34 0 82 0 0 85 1 0  0 1 6 4  30 0 1 1 33 2 8 . 1 0 
4 5 1 3 0  40 0 1 40 29 0 1 3 0  3 5  0 1 3 1  27 0 1 3 0  40 0 1 50 0 0 1 48 30 0 1 07 0 0 1 20 l 0 1 6 4  29 0 1 3 50 23 . l  0 
5 1 1 3 0  40 0 1 6 5  25 0 1 3 0  40 0 1 3 1  27 0 0 40 0 J OO 34 0 1 3 5  34 0 82 0 0 55 34 0 1 6 4  29 0 1 0 97a 3 0 . 3 0 
5 2 1 3 0  40 0 1 54 25 0 1 3 0  33 0 1 3 1  26 0 0 40 0 1 00 34 0 1 50 34 0 85 0 0 60 30 0 1 6 4  30 0 1 1 04 29 . 2  0 
5 3 1 3 0  3 8  0 1 43 27 0 1 3 0  2 9  0 1 3 1  24 0 0 40 0 1 00 3 4  0 1 3 5  34 0 85 0 0 70 30 0 1 6 4  28 0 1 0 88 2 8. 4 0 
5 4 1 3 0  3 8  0 1 54 26 0 1 3 0  29 0 1 3 1  20 0 0 40 0 1 00 34 0 1 3 5  34 0 85 0 0 75 30 0 1 24 28 0 936 b 27 . 9 0 
5 5 1 3 0  3 8  0 1 6 5  25 0 1 3 0  30 0 1 3 1  20 0 100 40 0 1 20 1 0 1 3 5  34 0 90 0 0 97 l 0 1 2 4  28 0 1 22 2  21 . 7  0 
6 1  1 3 0  40 0 1 6 5  25 0 1 3 0  3 8 0 1 3 1  25 0 0 40 0 1 00 3 4 0 1 3 5  3 4 0 90 0 0 50 l 0 1 24 29 0 1 055 26 . 6 0 
6 2 1 3 0  40 0 1 6 5  25 0 1 3 0  40 0 1 3 1  25 0 0 40 0 1 0 0  3 4  0 1 3 5  34 0 90 0 0 55 10 0 1 3 2  27 0 1 06 8 27 . 5 0 
6 3 1 3 0  40 0 1 87 23 0 1 3 0  42 0 1 3 2  24 0 0 40 0 1 1 0  3 4  0 1 3 5  34 0 92 0 0 70 l 0 1 3 2  27 0 1 1 1 8  26 . 5  0 
6 4 130 40 0 1 7 6  24 0 200 0 0 1 3 2  24 0 0 40 0 1 1 0  34 0 1 3 5  34 0 92 0 0 85 l 0 1 40 25 0 1 200 22 . 2  0 
6 5 1 3 0  40 0 1 6 5  25 0 1 80  0 0 1 3 2  24 0 1 00 40 0 1 20 1 0 1 40 34 0 95 0 0 1 20 l 0 1 3 2  28 0 1 3 1 4  1 9 . 3  0 
a , 1092 
b . 1064 
45 
SPU 
Experiment 4 
BO 20 O J OO J 4  J 200 JO 0 50 J O  0 1 3 0  4 0 J OO 28 0 1000 1 4  1 J 45 16 0 J 80 1 2  0 200 J O  0 2J 85 1 3 . 8  2 
50 30 O 1 50 6 0 1 50 24 0 1 40 0 BO 2 0 J O O  1 0 50 1 4  0 85 23 0 1 56 1 5  O 200 10 0 1 0 2 2  J6 . 5  0 
1 3  45 40 0 100 1 0 0 200 1 9 0 50 5 0 85 2 O J OO 0 7 5 1 4 0 1 1 6  20 0 1 56 J 5 0 200 1 0 0 1 1 27 1 ) . 6 0 
1 4 45 40 O 200 8 0 400 30 0 50 2 0 100 2 0 1 00 J 200 1 4  0 1 4 5 16 J 6 4  14 1 300 1 0  1 1 7 04 13 . 7  4 
1 5 40 36 0 1 50 1 2  0 300 8 0 25 40 0 80 4 0 I 00 17 0 200 3 2 1 1 45 1 96 J 0 1 200 5 0 1 436 1 6 .  9 3 
6 45 29 0 200 9 0 250 0 10 40 0 7 5  4 0 1 00 34 0 70 29 0 1 1 0 10 0 J 0 8  21 0 200 5 0 I J6 8  1 8. 7 0 
7 43 3 1  O J O O  1 8  0 300 21 0 5 30 0 80 4 0 1 00 34 0 100 16 0 1 3 0  5 0 1 0 8  21 0 3 00 5 0 1 26 6  J 8. 5 0 
8 40 31 O 3 50 21 0 400 16 0 50 30 0 82 4 0 1 00 34 0 300 30 l 1 25 1 8  0 1 0 8  2J o 300 1 0  0 1 855 2J . 5  
9 3 0  3 0  O 200 1 9  0 300 8 0 50 40 0 7 0  5 0 1 00 3 4  0 250 5 I 1 20 20 0 J 0 8  2J 0 300 1 0  1 J 52 8  1 9 . 2  2 
10 3 0  2 8  0 2 0 0  3 0  0 3 00 8 0 7 0  20 0 6 0  4 0 200 1 0 1 85 1 2  0 1 50 16 0 86 30 0 2 0 0  1 0  0 1 4 81 1 6 . 9  0 
2 1  35 40 0 200 3 8 0 300 16 0 50 3 0 0 80  4 0 50 3 4 0 1 80 1 2 0 1 20 5 0 20 3 2 0 200 1 0 0 1 23 5  22 . 1 0 
2 2 33 40 0 200 36 0 200 31 0 10 40 0 90 4 0 50 34 0 1 85 1 2  0 1 1 5  4 0 20 32 0 200 10 0 1 1 03 2 4 . 3  0 
2 3  3 5  40 0 300 3 0 0 300 8 0 1 0 40 0 1 00 4 0 50 3 4 0 1 85 1 2 1 130 1 20 3 2 0 3 00 1 0 1 1 43 0  21 . J 3 
2 4 3 9  3 9  0 200 40 0 3 00 8 0 1 00 20 0 95 4 0 1 0 0  34 0 1 85 4 0 1 20 2 0 20 32 0 200 1 5  0 1 3 5 9  1 9 . 8 0 
3 1  30 40 0 1 50 36 0 300 27 0 1 0 0  20 0 7 5 5 0 200 1 7 1 300 3 4 1 1 1 8  1 O J 2 33 0 200 J 5 0 1 4 85 22 . 8 2 
3 2 20 40 0 1 50 3 9  0 300 27 0 J OO 20 0 67 5 0 1 00 17 0 J 80  34 0 1 1 6  0 1 2  33 0 200 1 0  0 J 2 45 2 2 . 6  0 
3 3 25 40 0 200 3 8  0 300 8 0 J OO 20 0 90 4 0 1 00 17 l 200 1 2  0 1 1 8  0 1 2  3 3  0 300 1 0  1 1 445 J 8, 3  2 
3 4 40 40 0 J OO 32 0 300 27 0 1 20 20 0 1 00 5 0 1 00 17 0 225 8 l l 7 0 4 33 0 200 20 I 1 3 06 20 . 3  2 
3 5 6 0 40 0 13 0 3 5 0 3 00 8 0 1 20 20 0 7 5 5 0 200 17 0 200 0 1 1 6  0 4 3 4 0 200 1 5 0 1 40 5 17 • 6 0 
4 1 40 40 0 1 50 3 8  0 400 1 2  1 1 20 20 0 7 5  4 0 1 00 17 0 1 7 5  0 I J 5  0 4 34 0 200 1 5  0 J 3 7 9  1 8 . 2  1 
4 2  40 40 0 1 3 0  40 0 200 2 8 0 1 2 0  20 0 80  5 0 1 00 1 7 0 1 7 5  0 1 1 4  0 4  3 4 0 200 1 5 0 1 1 6 3  20 . 1 0 
4 3  50 40 0 1 50 3 5 0 1 00 23 0 1 20 20 0 90 5 0 1 00 1 7 0 200 O I J 8  0 4  3 4 0 200 1 5 0 l l 3 2  1 9 . 1 0 
4 4 80 40 0 1 00 3 8  0 300 8 0 1 2 0  20 0 J 20 5 0 50 0 225 0 1 20 0 4 34 0 300 10 I 1 4 1 9  1 5 .  8 I 
4 5 80 40 O J O O  3 9  0 300 8 O 1 20 20 0 1 1 0  5 0 50 0 1 97 0 1 1 6  2 0 4 34 0 200 15 0 1 27 7  1 6 . 5  0 
5 1  40 40 0 90 3 8 0 1 99 1 9 0 1 2 0  20 0 1 00 6 0 1 00 1 7 0 1 97 0 1 1 6  4 0 4  3 4 0 250 1 5 0 1 21 6  1 9 . 4 0 
5 2 40 40 0 70 3 8  0 1 50 26 0 J 50 20 0 200 4 0 1 00 17 0 225 1 1 8  0 4 34 0 250 1 5  1 1 3 07 1 9 . 6  2 
5 3 55 40 0 80 3 8  0 1 50 16 0 1 50 10 0 90 4 0 1 00 17 0 205 0 1 1 7 1 0 4 34 0 200 J 5  0 1 1 51 1 7 . 6  0 
5 4 55 . 4  40 0 65 30 0 300 8 l 1 50 1 0  0 90 5 0 1 00 1 7  0 2 J O  0 1 20 l 0 4 3 4  0 250 1 0  1 1 3 4 4  1 5 . 6  2 
5 5 60 40 0 65 3 5  0 J 50 30 0 1 50 20 0 90 5 0 1 00 17 0 200 0 1 1 7  8 0 4 34 0 200 1 5  0 1 1 36 20 . 5  0 
46 
300 6 0 1 1 0  30 0 100 6 0 1 50 10 0 60 
2 500 7 l 1 2 1  29 0 1 50 1 0  0 250 1 0  0 6 0  
3 300 4 0 1 1 0  3 0  0 2 0 0  1 0  0 1 7 0  1 0  0 50 
4 3 50 5 0 1 3 2  28 0 1 3 5  4 0 200 1 8  0 l 
5 300 2 0 1 43 27 0 1 7 0  1 5  0 200 1 8  0 50 
2 l 400 7 0 1 43 27 0 1 00 1 0  0 200 1 0  0 3 5  
2 2 5 0 0  6 l 1 43 2 7  0 5 0  5 0 2 0 0  1 3  0 20 
2 3 700 2 l 1 43 27 0 300 25 l 200 13 0 s 
2 4 200 7 0 1 43 27 0 l SO s 0 l SO 13 0 s 
2 s 7 00 1 0  l 1 7 6  24 0 l SO 6 0 200 13 0 s 
3 l 1 00 s 0 1 6 S  2S 0 3 0  l S  0 200 l S  0 s 
3 2 200 7 0 363 7 0 70 s 0 2SO l S  0 s 
3 3 200 10 0 407 3 l 1 0 0  4 . S  0 300 1 5  l s 
3 4 200 1 0  0 275 l S  0 100 s 0 200 13 0 s 
3 s 200 1 0  0 363 7 0 l SO 6 0 2SO 13 0 s 
4 l 250 10 0 407 3 0 1 0 0  
4 2 200 l 0 0 3 85 5 0 1 20 
4 3 1 0 0  1 2  0 3 96  4 0 1 00 
4 4 200 1 2  0 429 l l 50 
4 s 200 1 1  0 41 8 2 0 6 0
0 27 5 1 3  0 5 
6 0 200 13 0 5 
5 0 2 2 S  1 3  0 s 
3 0 300 13 0 s 
4 0 2 2 5  10 0 
5 l 1 00 1 2  0 429 l 0 1 00 4 0 225 10 0 s 
5 2 1 00 1 2  0 429 l l 200 s 0 300 10 0 s 
s 3 1 00 1 2  0 407 l 0 100 s 0 200 l S  0 s 
s 4 1 50 1 2  0 429 l l 200 3 0 2 SO 1 9  0 5 
s s l SO 10 0 209 21 0 1 7 5  4 0 230 1 9  0 5 
a ,  18 , 6  
SPU 
Exper iment 5 
40 0 1 3 0  20 0 1 0 0  1 8  0 1 0  
4 0  0 1 3 0  2 0  l 1 1 0  1 9  0 1 3  
4 0  0 2 0  3 4  0 90 20 0 1 5  
40 0 1 0  3 4  0 95 22 0 7 
40 0 1 0  3 4  0 1 3 0  2 2  0 6 3  
4 0  0 1 0  3 4  0 90 22 0 1 3  
4 0 1 0  3 4  l 9 5  2S 0 7 
40 0 1 0  3 4  0 1 00 2 6  0 1 3  
4 0  0 1 0  3 4  0 4 34 0 7 
40 0 1 0  
4 0  0 1 0  
4 0  0 1 0  
4 0  0 1 0  
4 0  0 1 0  
4 0  0 1 0  
4 0  0 1 0  
4 0  0 1 0  
4 0  0 1 0  
4 0  0 1 0  
40 0 1 0  
4 0  0 1 0  
4 0  0 1 0  
4 0  0 1 0  
40 0 1 0  
40 0 1 0  
3 4  0 9 5  
3 4  0 4 
34 0 4 
34 0 4 
34 0 4 
34 0 4 
34 0 so 
34 0 so 
34 0 2S 
3 4  0 50 
3 4  0 50 
3 4  0 4 
34 0 20 
34 0 20 
3 4  0 1 0  
3 4  0 50 
SPU 
Experiment 6 
34 0 1 0  
3 4  0 7 
34 0 1 0  
3 4  0 1 3  
3 4  0 1 3  
3 4  0 1 3  
3 4  0 1 3  
3 4  0 1 0  
3 4  0 1 3  
3 4  0 1 0  
3 4  0 1 0  
3 4  0 7 
34 0 
3 4  0 1 0  
3 4  0 1 0  
3 4  0 1 0  
1 0  0 1 00 1 5  0 1 00 20 0 1 1 6 0  1 7 . 5  0 
10 0 200 l S  0 1 20 1 5  0 1 6 5 4  1 7 . 5  2 
l S  0 l SO l S  0 1 3 0  10 0 1 23 5  1 8. 8  0 
1 0  0 l SO 1 5  0 1 3 0  8 0 1 21 0  1 8 . 4  0 
10 0 1 6 0  l S  0 1 3 0  5 0 1 3 56 1 8. 8  0 
1 0  0 1 6 0  1 8  0 130 l 0 1 2 81 1 7 . 9  0 
10 0 1 6 0  1 5  0 1 3 0  1 0 1 3 1 5  14 2 
10 0 1 6 0  1 5  0 130 2 0 1 7 6 1  1 9 . 4  2 
1 0 0 1 6 0  1 8 0 130 1 0 9S 9  1 8. 9 0 
1 0  0 1 6 0  1 8  0 130 l 0 1636 1 9  
1 0  0 1 6 0  1 8  0 1 3 0  l 0 Bi l 1 9 . 7  0 
1 0  0 1 6 0  1 8  0 1 3 0  l 0 1 20 2  1 7 . I  0 
1 0 0 1 6 0  1 8 0 1 3 0  l 0 1 329 17 2 
10 0 1 6 0  1 8  0 130 2 0 1 0 97 1 8. l  0 
l 0 0 16 o 3 4 0 13 0 2 0 1 2  85 1 9 o 
10 0 2000 33 1 1 3 0  l 0 3 2 40 1 7 . 9  l 
7 0 1 6 0  l S  0 1 3 0  2 0 1 27 0  1 6 . 6  0 
0 1 6 0  34 0 1 3 0  3 0 ! l6 4  1 88 0 
0 1 6 0  34 0 1 3 0  3 0 1344 1 8. l  l 
0 1 6 0  34 0 1 3 0  2 0 1 26 8  1 7 . 8  0 
1 0  0 1 6 0  34 0 1 3 0  3 0 l l 7 0  1 8. 2  0 
5 0 1 6 0  3 4  0 1 3 0  3 0 1 3 S S  1 7 . 8  1 
1 0  0 1 6 0  34 0 1 3 0  3 0 1 1 42 1 8. 8  0 
13 0 1 6 0  1 8  0 130 5 0 1354 1 7 . 9  l 
l S 0 1 6 0  1 8  0 1 3 0  5 0 1 1 2 9 20 0 
1 0 0  17 0 1 3 0  30 0 1 00 s 0 100 1 0  0 1 0 0  10 0 so 2 8  0 200 2 0 1 50 11 0 200 1 5  0 7 6  2 0  0 1 206 1 4 . 8 0 
2 90 1 9  0 1 3 0  30 l 1 00 s 1 1 00 20 0 1 00 1 4  0 100 22 0 3 00 1 4  l 1 5 9  1 1  l 1 80 1 5  0 1 1 6 20 0 1366 17 4 
3 BS . S  32 0 1 3 0  40 0 9S 7 0 1 00 2S 0 1 00 15 0 1 00 3 0  0 2SO 17 l 300 4 1 200 lS 1 1 1 6 20 0 1476 20 . 5  3 
4 7 S . 2  33 0 1 20 40 0 95 l S  0 so 30 0 10 20 0 so 3S 0 1 50 1 8  0 50 34 0 50 1 5  0 1 0 8  20 0 7 S 8  26 0 
s 7 5 . 2  33 0 l SO 40 0 9S 16 0 1 00 3 0  0 50 20 0 so 20 0 200 8 0 7 S  3 0  0 7 0  l S  0 7 6  1 0  0 91 1 •  22 . 2  0 
6 90 31 0 1 50 40 0 100 16 0 1 00 30 0 80 20 0 0 40 0 200 9 0 6S 32 0 1 00 6 0 92 10 0 97 7 23 . 4 0 
7 90 31 0 l SO 40 0 1 00 16 0 l SO 30 0 1 00 0 0 so 30 0 2SO 1 5  0 1 2S 2 0 50 1 5  0 92 l 0 1 1 57 1 8  0 
8 9 8  3 1  0 1 3 0  40 0 1 0 5  16 0 l SO 30 0 1 20 s 0 80 30 0 220 2S 0 1 00 10 0 80 1 5  0 1 0 8  l 0 1 1 91 20 , 3  0 
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0 20 
0 20 
1 20 
0 1 0  
0 1 0  
0 1 5  
1 5  
1 5  
1 0  
0 1 0  
0 1 5  
0 1 0  
0 1 5  
0 1 0  
0 1 5  
0 1 0  
0 1 0  
0 1 5  
0 200 
0 1 80  
0 220 
160 
1 5 5  
95 
30 
25 
1 00 
50 
20 
1 5  
1 0  
10  
5 
1 0  
5 
1 0  
1 3  
50 
60 
7 5  
0 45 
1 55 
0 6 5  
0 30 
0 3 5  
0 49 
0 3 9  
1 89 
0 47 
0 36 
0 44 
0 42 
1 57 
1 36 
0 52  
0 75  
0 6 9  
0 65  
0 100  
1 49  
0 200 
0 1 50 
0 200 
40 
70  
60 
40 
20 
26 
52 
26 
0 
26 
0 
26 
0 
1 0  
0 5 . 3  
5 . 1  
2 . 9 
2 . 4  
2 . 7 
5 . 4  
3 , 9  
5 . 6  
0 4 .  9 
0 4 
0 13 . 1  
0 5 . 3 8  
1 4 . 2  
0 6 
0 5. 2 
0 6 .  8 
0 5 . 3  
4 . 2  
I 4 
1 3 .  5 
0 8. 3 
5 .  8 
4. 9 
4 . 6  
1 3 , 3  
0 2 1 .  5 
0 20 . 9 
0 2 1 .  2 
7 , 6  
6 . 2  
2 .  7 
1 .  9 
2 . 8  
2 . 2  
I 
1 .  2 
3 
I .  4 
2 . 2  
• 5 
1 . 6 
3 
5 
4 
5 
6 
3 
6 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
4 
3 
2 
2 
3 
2 
3 
0 
0 
0 
5 4  
5 5  
DC 
Expe r iment 3 
1000 240 1 200 1 00 7 00 3 84 3 25 1 0  20 . 5  
2 7 5  1 90 1 200 200 1 50 4 3 1 0 6 . 3  
3 57 1 40 1 200 1 00 20 2 3 2 1 4 
4 1 3  1 0  1 200 20 33 1 3 1 I 2 . 2  
5 5 40 0 40 1 0  25 1 1 0 1 • 9 
DC 
Exper iment 4 
1 82 1 3 0  1 3 0  1 6  5 0 50 1 3 0  1 40 2 5  7 5  7 . 9  
2 1 3 0  1 40 0 1 0 0  1 3 0  50 230 7 8 50 50 7 . 4  
3 2 1 0  200 0 80 0 6 0  1 50 3 4  1 0  3 5  6 
4 96 1 7 5  88 1 00 0 1 0 0  1 3 0  50 1 00 3 8  6 . 7  
1 5 1 3 0  1 7  5 96 50 0 0 1 3 0  6 5  50 30 5 . 6  
DC 
Experiment 5 
1 1 7 6 0  0 43 40 7 0 8  5 1 0  1 0  22 50 1 2 .  7 2 42 0 3 0  40 1 25 5 1 2  1 3  26 1 50 3 . 4  3 50 0 20 40 43 3 7 5 1 1  1 00 2 . 1  4 1 0  0 20 40 43 1 1 0  2 5 0 1 5 3 0  0 40 40 1 1 5 8 4 0 1 6 20 0 40 40 0 0 1 5  1 1  3 1 00 1 .  8 1 7 20 0 40 40 0 0 1 7  9 2 1 00 1 .  8 
DC 
Experiment 6 
1 1 1 00 200 1 3 0  5 0  3 0 0  50 1 6 9  7 5  0 1 3 0  9 . 3  1 2 200 260 200 1 0 0  1 50 6 0  1 04 1 50 0 1 00 1 0 . 2 1 3 1 00 1 3 0  200 7 5  50 6 5  1 0 4  1 25 0 1 00 7 .  3 1 4 1 0 0  1 0 0  1 50 40 50 6 0  6 5  1 20 0 0 5 . 3  1 5 1 00 50 200 1 50 1 50 55 52 1 00 0 0 6 . 6  1 6 1 00 7 0  250 0 1 50 50 7 8  1 00 0 0 6 . 1  200 20 250 1 0  1 0  50 7 8  1 00 0 0 5 . 5 8 0 3 0  400 1 0  1 0  40 6 5  7 5  0 0 4 . 8 9 1 00 40 3 90 40 1 50 3 0  6 5  2 5  0 0 6 . 5  
• 
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FOOTNOTES 
Funding provided by the National Science Foundation and the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration ( NASA ) is 
gratefully acknowledge d .  T h e  comments of Mark Olson ( JPL ) on the 
statistical analysis and his computer programming assistance are 
both acknowledged .  
2 .  An exception i s  experiment 1 o f  SPU i n  which we did not 
explicitly restrict the message space s .  
3 .  Because o f  the restricted message spaces there exist perfect Nash 
equilibria where one or more individual s '  messages are at the 
boundary . 
4 .  The six experiments selected from Isaac , Mccue , and Plott ( 1985)  
were those that had ten subjects and no violation of rules . 
These were experiments 1 ,  2 ,  3 ,  4 ,  7 ,  8 .  
5 .  The rebate does not change the res ul t  of the equality test 
because it is a proportiona te transforma tion of the data . 
5 7  
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